@!«Εστίν ουν η ουσία των πραγμάτων αρμονία και αριθμός σφαιρών στρεφομένων»!@

*Διά-Κόσμος Ἑλλάς «Το ποιο επικίνδυνο από όλα τα ηθικά διλήμματα είναι όταν, είμαστε υποχρεωμένοι να κρύβουμε την αλήθεια για να βοηθήσουμε την αλήθεια να νικήσει»

Η ιστορία δεν είναι χρήσιμη επειδή διαβάζει κανείς εκεί το παρελθόν, αλλά επειδή διαβάζει το μέλλον

!@~~~@~~~@!

26.3.20

NATO STRATEGY IN A NEW WORLD ORDER- Gary L. Guertner


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NATO Strategy in a New World Order

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Guertner, Gary L.

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Final FROM TO _ 91/4/10 30.

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

IT COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP NATO; Wurope; security regime;

European security

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverseif necessary and identify by block number) This study examines the new strategy that is slowly taking shape within the

alliance, and the role that NATO is most likely to play within a larger European

security regime where responsibilities may be shared with other European

multination organizations--the European Community (EC), the Western European

Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

for example.

These and other organizations, the author contends, may compete, evolve,

engage in cooperative ventures, even merge. Their collective challenge is to

accommodate Europe's emergence from a U.S.-dominated security umbrella (NATO)

while maintaining an American presence in a new political-economic-security

order. The outcome will be determined through a slow, iterative process driven

by either declining or resurgent threats, and compromises among states over

divergent domestic agendas, limited willingness to relinquish national bover)

20 DISTRIBUTIONIAVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Block 19 cont.

sovereignty, suspicions between large and small commitments states, and varying to the American trans-Atlantic relationship.

NATO STRATEGY IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

Gary L. Guertner

April 10, 1991

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or

the U.S. Government. This report is approved for public

release; distribution unlimited.

COMMENTS

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and

may be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.

Comments also may be conveyed by calling the author via

commercial (717) 245-3234 or AUTOVON 242-3234.

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iil

FOREWORD

American military forces contributed to the victories in two

European wars and in a protracted cold war. Victory, however,

has not ended the U.S. commitment to NATO or to European

security. On the contrary, the post-cold war world confronts the

alliance with an even broader range of security issues. This

study examines the new strategy that is slowly taking shape

within the alliance, and the role that NATO is most likely to play

within a larger European security regime where responsibilities

may be shared with other European multination

organizations-the European Community (EC), the Western

European Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for example.

These and other organizations, the author argues, may

compete, evolve, engage in cooperative ventures, even

merge. Their collective challenge is to accommodate Europe's

emergence from a U.S.-dominated security umbrella (NATO)

while maintaining an American presence in a new

political-economic-security order. The outcome will be

determined through a slow, iterative process driven by either

declining or resurgent threats, and compromises among states

over divergent domestic agendas, limited willingness to

relinquish national sovereignty, suspicions between large and

small states, and varying commitments to the American trans-

Atlantic relationship.

The author would like to thank Mrs. Marianne Cowling and

Colonels David Jablonsky, John J. Hickey, Jr., Robert R. Ulin,

Phillip W. Mock, and Donald E. Lunday for their helpful

comments and suggestions.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present this

study as part of the continuing debate over NATO strategy and

the U.S. commitment to European security.

KARL W. ROBINSON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF THE AUTHOR

GARY L. GUERTNER is the Director of Research at the

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He holds

B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from the University

of Arizona and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the

Claremont Graduate School. A former Marine Corps officer

and veteran of Vietnam, Dr. Guertner has also served on the

staff of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and

as a Professor of Political Science at the University of

California, Fullerton. His latest book is Deterrence and Defense

in a Post-Nuclear World (St. Martin's, 1990).

iv

NATO STRATEGY

IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

The most immediate threat to Western Europe during the

cold war was the shadow of Soviet military superiority looming

from the East, proscribing Western political and economic

freedom. NATO and its link to U.S. military power deterred

political intimidation as well as a less probable military thrust

into Western Europe. But these threats have faded under

Mikhail Gorbachev, replaced by revolutions in Eastern Europe,

the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, receding Soviet military

power, German unification, and the stirring of political and

economic freedom nurtured by the West.

These events are linked directly to the Gorbachev domestic

revolution, a revolution that depends not only on domestic

change, but equally on political-economic integration with the

West and dramatic shifts from defense to domestic investment.

New Soviet military thinking, arms control, and unilateral cuts

in Soviet conventional force structure are dramatic in

themselves. But when projected on a new map of Europe,

these events call for a major reexamination of NATO military

strategy and the future role of the U.S. military in a revised

NATO.

A new strategy for NATO has been quietly taking shape

since 1989, the debate often muffled by more dramatic events

in the Soviet Union and more recently by war in the Persian

Gulf. By the spring of 1991 the broad outlines of a new NATO

within a radically new European security regime began to

emerge.1 This study assesses both the emerging new strategy

and the larger European security environment in which it will

evolve.

THE CHANGING THREAT

American military forces have contributed to the victories

in two wars and in a protracted cold war. Victory, however, does

not end a commitment. On the contrary, victory in the cold war

1

has left the United States with new as well as old interests and

objectives in Europe. These include:

* Political stability

* Deterrence of residual Soviet threats

• Deterrence of intra-regional conflict in Eastern Europe

* Economic participation in European markets

* Preservation of newly emerging democratic

governments

The continuity of U.S.-European relations will lie in

Washington's ability to formulate a new strategy for the

continued linkage of American and European security. The

framework of that strategy must include clearly articulated

objectives and strategic concepts for achieving those

objectives when they are confronted with a range of evolving

threats.

The immediate and urgent Soviet problem is economic

recovery. Soviet military forces had to be reduced to finance

economic reform. We should not, however, underestimate the

risks that unilateral withdrawals of military forces from Eastern

Europe, the CFE, and the START treaties entailed for

Gorbachev. Historically, the Soviet Union depended

disproportionately on its military might for superpower status.

Previous Soviet leaders assumed the convertibility of military

power to diplomatic, economic, and psychological gains

consistent with Soviet desires to extend their influence. The

size and sophistication of Soviet forces historically have been

the most visible product of industrial modernization, and they

have conveyed the trappings of success. In Soviet eyes,

respect and authority must certainly spill over to their political

and ideological claims.

Gorbachev openly challenged these sacred assumptions.

Security, he has argued, and by inference superpower status,

cannot rest on military power alone. Political and economic

cooperation with the West is an essential part of state security

2

in the nuclear age. The Gorbachev domestic agenda signaled

a new, more cooperative phase in Soviet-American relations

and ultimately a stronger, more competitive Soviet industrial

base. No one can say, however, whether a rehabilitated Soviet

socioeconomic system will spawn a more assertive foreign

policy or a status quo mentality anxious to preserve the benefits

of reduced tensions abroad and higher living standards at

home.

The logic of Gorbachev's reform strategy suggests that

Soviet national interests would be served in the preservation

of a cooperative, economically integrated international order

that aids and abets economic perestroika. But two undesirable

outcomes are also possible-a reconstituted technological

base and assertive military or, at the other extreme, total failure

and systemic collapse accompanied by accelerating violence

and separatist tendencies within the USSR. Either could

confront NATO with novel and unforeseen challenges. Neither

is compatible with U.S. or European interests. Responding to

a technologically revived Soviet military requires significantly

different measures than those needed to confront the

pressures resulting from a breakdown of authority and potential

civil war or revolution. The Soviet political system is in the early

phases of a profound revolution, the final phase of which

cannot be predicted. Systemic collapse, a conservative

restoration of power, or political instability throughout the

Soviet Union seem more likely than successful perestroika in

the next 10-15 years.

A worst-case scenario posited by Soviet reformers is a

Soviet Union that is trapped in the same political-economic

trends as Germany in the 1920s. In Weimar Germany, fragile

democratic institutions failed to reverse the hopeless economic

conditions from which radical nationalist movements grew and

seized power. A Soviet version would be a "nightmare for the

Soviet Union and Europe. 2

NATO should, therefore, aim for capabilities that afford

maximum flexibility to meet residual Soviet military threats as

well as new threats to the political stability of Europe. It would

be shortsighted and dangerous to truncate NATO's military

capabilities irreversibly at the precise moment that traditional

3

nationalisms are reappearing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union is balancing between chaos and repression. Throughout

the former "Eastern bloc" and in a united Germany, there

remain the problems of reconciling geography, historic

territorial claims and fears of hegemony, with the political

requirements for European stability. NATO's contribution in

some form to that stability remains indispensable, because

even after CFE and follow-on arms control treaties are

implemented. Europe will remain the most heavily armed

continent on earth, with millions of troops and tens of

thousands of tanks deployed there. The 20,000 tanks CFE

permits each group of countries (NATO and the former

members of the Warsaw Pact) to retain is nearly five times the

number Nazi Germany had wh.n World War II began.3

Europeans themselves have acknowledged potential

long-term, non-Soviet threats in several little nuticed provisions

of the CFE Treaty signed at the Paris Summit of the 34-nation

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on

November 19, 1990. For example, the British and French

insisted on the Article VII provision that imposes national as

well as alliance limitations. These provisions recognize that

existing alliances will not last in their current form forever.

Moreover, the limitations on individual countries within NATO

as well as on former members of the Warsaw Pact were

matched by provisions for a comprehensive verification

regime. The treaty permits not only alliance to alliance (formally

called "groups of countries" in the treaty) inspection, but also

allows each country to inspect any other member of its own

"group."4 The British, for example, may inspect German

installations, Germans may inspect the French, Hungarians

may inspect Poland. No signatory may deny on-site

inspections to any other signator.

These examples reflect a sober long-term perspective by

individual signatories. The precise means for maintaining

stability in Europe, however, will depend on the structure of and

relationships between emerging organizations that will

compete for roles in a future European security regime.

4

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURES

Changes in NATO strategy have always come gradually,

patiently shaped by balancing change with the consensus

building that is always vital to political cohesion and credible

coalition deterrence. NATO today is experiencing

unprecedented change in its grand strategy as well as in

alliance military strategy. Grand strategy encompasses all

aspects of NATO strategy-political, economic and military.

New architecture and military strategy will emerge in an

environment that must continue to satisfy simultaneously the

strategic objectives, individual political agendas, and domestic

constraints of member nations. The European Big Four

(Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) for example,

simultaneously want a strong European pillar, reduced

American influence, and long-term guarantees against the

hegemony of a single state or coalition. Small states want a

U.S. presence that balances the European Big Four. Flank

staLes (Norway and Turkey, for example) want no transfer of

power or responsibilities to other European institutions such as

the European Community (EC), Western European Union

(WEU), or the CSCE.

New and old European institutions are competing for

prominent positions in a new European security regime. NATO,

however, remains the dominant and most bureaucratically

powerful institution as well as the principal institution that

legitimizes the essential North American, trans-Atlantic military

link to European security. NATO is also the only institution that

is formulatingj a broad new grand strategy.

The first significant steps were incorporated in the July

1990 London Declaration, which affirmed nw elements of a

strategy that included smaller forces, lowered readiness,

multinationality, less reliance on nuclear forces, an arms

control regime, and mutual security. The London Declaration

literally kicked off "brainstorming" sessions within Alliance

Councils which, in turn, fed a major strategy review.. This

review produced a political-military strategy which, in turn,

provides guidance to the NATO Military Committee (MC) from

which specific operational concepts are derived. At this writing,

5

a broad political strategy has emerged from which tentative

conclusions may be drawn about the military strategies that are

most likely to be developed in support of it.

The old strategy that placed emphasis on the deterrence of

war and defense of territory is being redirected to a strategy

that deals with a broader operational continuum from

peacetime operations to crisis management to war. The new

strategy assumes an arms control regime composed of a

matrix of treaties and confidence building measures, and the

reduced forward presence of military forces. It also assumes

that NATO must develop new relationships with other

European multinational institutions that may acquire security

and defense roles, especially for non-NATO states in a more

fully integrated European community. Figure 1 illustrates which

of these institutions is most likely to play a significant role, with

NATO, across the continuum from peace to war. Whatever

may happen, however, it seems almost certain that as issues

cross the continuum from peace through crisis to war,

institutional responsibility will narrow and NATO will remain the

dominant organizational instrument on which European

security will ultimately depend.

EVOLVING STRATEGY AND STRUCTURES

PEACE - CRISIS ----- WAR

CSCE CSCE NATO

COUNCIL OF EUROPE WEU WEU*

EC NATO

WEU

NATO

* WEU FOR OUT-Co-THEATER OPERATIONS ONLY

Figure 1

6

There is no question that in a post-cold war Europe, NATO

will share responsibilities with other multinational institutions.

CSCE, for example, may evolve into the major peacetime

Pan-European political forum. The EC may expand its Western

European Base, acquiring new interests in security issues as

it grows. The emerging EC preference, particularly in Bonn and

Paris, is to broaden the organization's mandate to include a

common European defense policy. The WEU may evolve as

the principal European security pillar, bridging NATO and the

EC. Both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand have

endorsed the organic relationship between the EC and WEU,

and a strong European pillar under which more active French

military participation in European defense would be acceptable

to Paris.

The WEU may also play a key role in future out-of-area

contingencies and operations discussed below. All of the major

bodies illustrated in Figure 2 function to promote and reinforce

European integration. They are analogous to retail outlets in

- EUROPEAN

SECURITY

NATO E EC

(16) _ (12)

WEU COUNCI OF EUROPE

(9)

MILITARY PO CAL ECONOMIC

SECURITY STITY ,- PROSPERITY

EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY REGIME

Figure 2

7

an open security market. As such, they may compete, evolve,

engage in cooperative ventures, even merge. Their collective

challenge is to accommodate Europe's emergence from a

U.S.-dominated security umbrella while maintaining an

American presence in a new political-economic-security order.

The outcome will be determined through a slow, iterative

process driven by either declining or resurgent threats, and

compromises among states over divergent internal agendas,

limited willingness to relinquish national sovereignty,

suspicions between large and small states, varying

commitments to the trans-Atlantic relationship, and perhaps

even the difficulty of integrating "neutral" states in a new

European security regime.

PEACETIME MISSIONS FOR NATO

NATO peacetime functions inevitably will be subordinated

to other European institutions that will lead political and

economic changes. NATO's organizational structure,

bureaucratic skills, and credibility born of four decades of

experience can, however, give the alliance a major role as the

guardian of a growing arms control/confidence building regime

and multilateral deterrent that will remain vital to the long-term

stability of Europe.

Paradoxically, a liberal-conservative anti-NATO coalition

has emerged in the American Congress. Conservatives see

U.S. troop withdrawal as a logical consequence of the reduced

Soviet military threat. Liberals maintain that Europeans are

financially capable of providing for their own defense.6 While

the major thrust of their arguments is true, it is equally true that

the U.S. presence in NATO has always had political as well as

military objectives. The size and scope of U.S. military

presence will continue to diminish, but the political, as well as

security benefits of NATO will continue to justify a significant

U.S. role.

Military presence will link the United States to European

stability, deter both intra-regional conflicts and residual Soviet

conventional threats, ease fears of a hegemonic Germany, and

provide the United States with leverage for its economic

interests-interests that are potential sources of acrimony

8

between the two continents. Getting a foot in the economic

door is considerably easier when you remain firmly committed

to an evolving European security regime.

More directly, NATO will have a major peacetime mission

in cooperative ventures with CSCE in monitoring the current

arms control regime (INF and CFE Treaties) and negotiating

additional treaties. NATO is also organized to support a wide

range of confidence-building measures and military-to-military

contacts including:

* Military exchanges and seminars

* Joint officer education

* Cooperative exercises

* Joint plans for disaster relief and environmental

clean-up

* Contingency planning against international terrorism

* Intelligence sharing for counternarcotics operations

These missions alone do not justify maintaining an

elaborate collective defense under NATO. Peacetime

operations serve only as a reminder that NATO's primary

mission is deterrence during an evolutionary process. Its

objective continues to be collective defense in the

cost-effective, burden-sharing sense of the term as well as

resisting trends toward the nationalizing of defense policies,

trends from which rogue states historically have emerged to

threaten European security.

From the Soviet perspective, peacetime missions for

NATO that emphasize cooperation with the East and the

reduction of all NATO forces in the Central Region through the

CFE process help Soviet reformers play to conservative

constituents. This includes the military, already unhappy and

fighting rear guard actions against the prospect of reductions

in the Soviet strategic arsenal, the evacuation of Soviet forces

from East Europe, and a reunified Germany in NATO.

9

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND WAR

Crisis management and war are the mid- and extreme

points on NATO's emerging operational continuum. Crisis

resolution, the successful outcome of crisis management,

requires not only skillful diplomacy, but also a security

architecture backed by credible military capabilities.

Deterrence of conflict and intimidation remains the central

objective in at least four exclusive NATO functions:

* Deter and defend against residual threats from the

Soviet Union.

" Deter and defend against threats from countries other

than the Soviet Union (both in the European theater and

out-of-area operations).

" Preserve the strategic balance within Europe,

especially against the Soviets.

" Serve as a trans-Atlantic forum for consultation on

security issues.

Although most of these objectives are familiar, their

success in a new Europe required shedding many "sacred

cows" embodied in old NATO planning documents such as

Military Committee Document 14/3 (flexible response) and

related perennial debates over nuclear modernization. Figure

3 contrasts NATO's old strategic concepts and environment

with the "new thinking." The analysis that follows expands on

these new elements of strategy.

General Defense. As European security becomes more

fully integrated, new operational concepts will have to address

a broader spectrum of contingencies and more specialized

forces to meet threats from residual Soviet military power to

intra-European conflict, terrorism, and low- to mid-intensity

operations outside the region that may have a major impact on

European and U.S. interests.

Short-term changes in NATO strategy should avoid steps

which in fact or perception isolate the Soviet Union at a time of

domestic turmoil and political factionalism. Isolation is likely to

10

NATO STRATEGYWHAT

HAS CHANGED

OLD NEW

* SPECIFIC THREAT 0 GENERAL DEFENSE

" FORWARD DEFENSE 0 REDUCED FORWARD PRESENCE

* FIXED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS 0 MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY

* FLEXIBLE RESPONSE/EARLY USE 0 LAST RESORT

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

* NATIONAL FORMATIONS 0 MULTINATIONAL FORMATIONS

* SMALLER RESERVES/RAPID 0 GREATER RELIANCE ON RESERVES

MOBILIZATION

" SHORT WARNING 0 LONGER WARNING TIME

Figure 3

strengthen repressive forces, reinforcing their traditional siege

mentality at the expense of reformers who favor greater Soviet

political and economic integration with the West. This requires

both the peacetime, cooperative mission described above and

a pragmatic posture towards Moscow that supports

evolutionary change in the Soviet internal empire without

strident calls for the dissolution of the USSR. Threats arising

from Soviet domestic volatility or Soviet counterparts in

Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia and Romania, most notably) can

be contained or even deterred through active NATO

collaboration with other organizations that emerge in the new

European security regime, and with a continued U.S. presence

that provides both symbol and substance for an American

guarantee to the security of its European allies - old and new.

Perhaps the most immediate concern associated with

NATO's shift to a more general, post-cold war defense posture

is the issue of out-of-area operations. This recurring and

divisive issue resurfaced early in the Gulf crisis when the

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John R. Galvin,

argued that NATO should adopt a new "fire brigade" strategy

11

designed to facilitate rapid deployment beyond the existing

NATO Treaty area.7 "Fire brigades" represent a significant

evolution in Washington's original preference for a

geographically delimited alliance so that it could pursue its cold

war interests without the interference of junior allies, and, at

the same time, not be drawn into their overseas adventures.

By contrast, the "New World Order" of the 1990s requires

burden sharing not only in its economic sense, but also

because broad, collective action is required to legitimize the

use of force. As the Gulf War demonstrated, even the collective

action of NATO members was possible only because it took

place in support of United Nations resolutions and under WEU

coordination. Even this did not satisfy Soviet conservative

commentators who fear that the allied victory means NATO will

see itself as the world's policeman and will present a greater

danger than ever to the Soviet Union. 8

Old guard Soviet fears may be justified in terms of NATO

capabilities. General Galvin's concept for out-of-area

operations has, in fact, been dramatically put to the test. Two

of the ten American divisions (Seventh Corps representing 50

percent of the American forces stationed in Western Europe)

that fought in the Gulf were deployed from Europe, along with

one French division and also a British division with Royal Air

Force units deployed directly from Germany.

It is misleading, however, to suggest that the deployment

of NATO forces to the Gulf War represented a common view

within the alliance. In fact, a divisive debate ensued throughout

the crisis, and strains on the alliance were avoided, as they

have been in the past, by ad hoc arrangements among

consenting members and the appearance of passive solidarity

by nonparticipants.

NATO members were united in support of economic

sanctions against Iraq, but quickly split between the U.S.-UK

bloc which was preparing for war and a European-Canadian

bloc which favored a diplomatic solution. These factions

nonetheless demonstrated caution and moderation in their

handling of these policy differences, due to a common concern

that the alliance might not survive a recriminatory public

12

dispute over the Kuwait issue in an era of declining Soviet

threat.9

A lesson of the Gulf War was that European governments

which chose to support military operations coordinated their

policies under the auspices of the WEU rather than NATO.

They recognized the value of bolstering the "European Pillar"

of the NATO Alliance both to accommodate the American

pressure for burden sharing and as an expression of individual

regional security consciousness. Because military cooperation

was easier to achieve within the WEU, it is likely to gain support

as the bridge (or safety valve) between NATO and individual

members who desire to move European security policies

beyond the narrowly defined cold war boundaries of NATO

collective defense.

Forward Presence, Mobility and Flexibility. Forward

defense, the NATO concept of defending at the inter-German

border without trading space for time, seems conceptually

archaic today. Like busts of Lenin in Warsaw, old strategic

concepts are being replaced by the symbols of a new Europe.

The precise shape, size, or disposition of post-cold war NATO

forces in Europe is not clearly visible, but there is no doubt that

their numbers will be radically reduced and they will be

deployed over a wider area, obscuring familiar landmarks such

as NATO's "Center" and "Flanks."

Reduced forces, including an American presence that may

fall from an estimated 300,000 troops assigned to Europe to

below 100,000 deployed in a corps (two divisions) and several

Air Force wings, will require new doctrine and operational

concepts built around mobility. In war, they will require the

capacity to bring both air and ground forces swiftly to bear

against concentrations of hostile forces on a nonlinear

battlefield.

Mobility is vital at both the strategic and operational levels.

Strategic mobility is the air- and sea-lift capability to move

forces from the United States to Europe, or, as in the Gulf War,

from the United States and Europe to another theater.

Operational mobility was dramatically demonstrated by

coalition forces that outflanked the Iraqi army in two days with

13

nearly 200,000 troops in two heavy corps. But operational

mobility is more than wheels on combat forces. It includes

every functional asset required to sustain combat

operations-logistics, combat service support, air defense,

counter air, and the ability to suppress the mobility of the other

side.

The minimum operational force capable of executing these

missions is, according to General Galvin, a U.S. Corps.

Anything less denies the United States operational flexibility

and strategic planning in war. "That," in the worst sense of the

term, would constitute "an entangling alliance." 10

In peace, U.S. forces must be deployed in a fashion

consistent with German sovereignty and German sensitivities

to "singularization" in the sense that Germany not remain the

host for the bulk of allied forces. Harmonizing national force

structures with an alliance that assumes new peacetime

missions and at the same time must provide credible

deterrence in and out of the European theater will be

successfully accomplished only if the alliance can agree on

other mutually supporting strategic concepts that are changing

as dramatically as forward defense.

"Last Resort": The New Flexible Response. Declaratory

changes in flexible response announced at the London

meeting of the North Atlantic council mark the transition from

a nuclear-dominant American NATO pillar to a

nonnuclear-dominant European pillar. "There will be,"

according to the London Declaration, "a significantly reduced

role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range... in

the transformed Europe, they (the allies] will be able to adopt

a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of

last resort."1

"Sub-strategic nuclear systems" or short-range nuclear

forces (SNF) represent the critical link between conventional

defense in Europe and escalation to strategic nuclear

exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The American nuclear umbrella has not necessarily been

removed, but it has become less relevant because of the

reduced risk of attack by massive Soviet ground forces that

14

would have triggered the chain of escalation embodied in the

old NATO strategy.

Old flexible response, in theory, was an initial defense of

Europe with conventional forces. In practice, political

requirements within the alliance resulted in a more ambiguous

strategy. Flexible response did not threaten precise timetables

for escalation from conventioal to nuclear war. NATO's exact

response to aggression confronted Soviet planners with three

possible responses if deterrence failed: (1) "Effective defense"

by conventional forces; (2) the threat of early escalation to

nuclear weapons; and (3) the threat of nuclear retaliation

against Soviet territory. Confronted with a credible NATO force

structure, Soviet leaders could not be certain which level of

response their actions, even if limited to conventional forces,

might trigger.

Deterrence of nuclear war between the United States and

the USSR was directly linked to NATO strategy for deterring

war in Europe. Europe was the crucible from which nuclear

escalation would be triggered. Strategic coupling of U.S.

nuclear weapons with European security has been the

dominant factor in NATO strategy for 40 years. Strategy

evolved, but its evolution always centered on how best to

structure credible extended deterrence by linking the American

infantryman in Europe to U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.

Ambiguity in the form of prewar threats to escalate conflict

to nuclear strikes on Soviet territory strengthened deterrence.

For Americans, however, strategic coupling, forward defense,

and reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons were among

the least obstructed paths to intercontinental nuclear war if

deterrence failed. Together they became an escalation trap

that stripped away all pretense of crisis management. A

strategy that depended on rapid escalation to intercontinental

nuclear exchanges was credible only for extreme

contingencies such as massive Soviet conventional and

nuclear attacks across a broad front in Europe and/or against

the United States. 12

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the signing of the

CFE Treaty undercut these long-standing Western

15

requirements for early nuclear escalation. There is no longer

any overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority to be offset

by nuclear weapons. Moreover, many, if not all, Soviet SNF

have been reportedly redeployed to the Russian republic; no

former ally in the Warsaw Pact is a willing host, and the

non-Russian republics pose growing security risks.13

Soviet withdrawals mean the elimination of a large portion

of the fixed targets that drove the size of NATO nuclear

deployments. In the unlikely event of a Soviet attack in the near

future, NATO's principal targets would be Soviet forces

crossing back into Eastern Europe and their supporting bases.

Such targets would be more suitable for conventional weapons

that are politically acceptable in peacetime, immediately

responsive in a conflict, and more discriminant and effective if

available in sufficient numbers.

Extended deterrence in the form of military presence

requires credible U.S. efforts to assist NATO allies in their own

defense, in Europe. Under current political conditions, strategic

coupling of that defense to U.S. strategic nuclear weapons is

neither a prudent strategy for Americans nor a reasonable

expectation for Europeans. The nuclear umbrella is a symbol

of the cold war. Attempts to hold it over a revolutionary new

Europe will only succeed in strengthening those factions on

both sides of the Atlantic who will use it as an excuse for not

supporting conventional deterrence in Europe. The result could

produce self-deterrence and political impotence.

A continuing American presence and conventional

weapons modernization under CFE limitations that provide a

range of options from mid-intensity conflict (in or out of the

European theater) to the massive firepower required to deter

residual Soviet capabilities will provide the most credible

deterrent to Europe's most likely conflicts in the first decades

of the 21 st century.

The most important objective for NATO in an expanding

European security regime is to achieve stable deterrence by

denying Soviet (or others in the future) capabilities for shortwarning

attack, and the embodiment of that threat in large

numbers of armored divisions and artillery. These have

traditionally been "the root of military instability in Europe., 14

16

These broad objectives have and should continue to be

pursued through a three-pronged strategy that reduces the

requirements for nuclear weapons. The first is arms control

(CFE, INF and perhaps SNF) to reduce offensive structure; the

second is the confidence building and arms control verification

regimes that, together with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact

and withdrawal of Soviet forces behind their own borders,

restrict operational capabilities; and the third is conventional

arms modernization of residual NATO forces.

Conventional arms modernization and new military

doctrine are inextricably linked in U.S. Airland Battle concepts.

Airland Battle integrates modern high-tech weapons and

operational mobility to strike anywhere on the battlefield. It is

defined by smart bombs, stealth fighters, short-range tactical

missile systems (ATACMS) and the Multiple Launched Rocket

System (MLRS) both with "smart" submunitions, helicopters,

air assault forces, modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles;

all linked and directed by space and airborne warning and

target acquisition systems. These are the weapons, the

doctrine, and the technologies that former Soviet Army Chief

of Staff, Marshall N.V. Ogarkov predicted during their early

testing phases would give "conventional forces on the

defensive the same degree of lethality as battlefield nuclear

weapons. "15

To a degree, the worst fears of Marshall Ogarkov and his

successors were realized in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait

when U.S.-led coalition forces devastated a former Soviet ally

along with thousands of Soviet tanks, artillery units, air defense

systems, and other equipment. The Iraqi test-bed for U.S. hightech

conventional forces and the doctrinal capabilities of

Airland Battle against a numerically superior force strengthens

the position of those who argue that NATO's new military

strategy should adopt similar operational concepts for the

defense of Europe. 16

The imperatives for conventional deterrence are further

underscored by U.S. and NATO decisions to forgo

modernization of the Lance surface-to-surface nuclear missile

(FOTL) and nuclear artillery shells. Moreover, no NATO capital

appears willing to host any new nuclear system, including the

17

problem-plagued tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) that

was to have been deployed on U.S. aircraft in Germany and

the United Kingdom. 17

SNF negotiations are compelling to NATO allies who want

a process that formally binds all parties, and provides a

defense against political reversals. The prospects for an SNF

agreement, however, were much better before the Gorbachev

peace offensive was derailed by internal problems. The

conservative party-military backsliding in other arms control

fora (CFE and START) suggests that SNF negotiations may

become a solution in search of a problem. Tacit bargaining and

informal agreements may be more expedient. At worst, the

level of political uncertainty in the Soviet Union means the

uncontroversial retention of current NATO air-delivered

nuclear weapons. The withdrawal of Soviet SNF and air

defenses from Eastern Europe means that a small, airdeliverable

theater nuclear arsenal and conventional missiles

and smart weapons can credibly hold Soviet targets at risk.

NATO's greatest obstacle may be more political than

military-namely, its nuclear addiction as a substitute for

conventional deterrence.

Multinational Formations. The massive changes in

NATO's political-military strategy require a new stationing

regime that reflects both the reductions in forward deployed

forces and sensitivity to German sovereignty. The traditional

high concentration and visibility of American and allied forces

in Germany with all of their associated, obtrusive training and

overflight activities must change if a domestic political backlash

is to be avoided. The most probable solution to these and

related problems is the creation of multinational formations that

are more widely dispersed within the NATO theater.

The concept of multinational forces in NATO has always

been present in the sense that national forces were designated

to fight under a common command at predesignated sectors

of the old inter-German border. There has also been functional

or specialized multinationality such as the crews aboard

AWACS and the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force

which has the mission to move light forces rapidly in a crisis.

18

General Galvin favors the corps as the basic U.S. combat

effective, operational force. 18 Corps have infinite flexibility for

the creation of multinational units in that they may be built from

divisions, brigades, or combinations of the two. Multinational

corps in NATO would reduce the costs of U.S. presence by

streamlining command structures and spreading support

requirements among allies. Washington, however, may insist

that its post-CFE forces remain in a single corps, reinforced by

units of other allies. Dispersing limited U.S. resources would

make strategic planning and out-of-theater operations more

difficult.

A multinational corps structure for NATO need not be

controversial or rigid. Its design should accommodate the

mobilization and reinforcement capabilities of individual allies.

During the transition from crisis to war, NATO could, for

examole, be reinforced by a quick reaction U.S. Corps, or

prepianned brigade packages from several allies could merge

in predesignated European assembly areas. In war. a detailed

mix of national, binational, and multinational corps could

quickly be brought to bear against any conceivable fcrce.

The Gulf crisis demonstrated the potency of the multinational

corps concept when, with little prior planning, the

British First Armored Division fought under the command of the

U S. Seventh Corps, and, astonishingly to many, the French

Sixth Light Armored Division fought under the U.S. Eighteenth

Airborne Corps. The Gulf experience and its decisive allied

military victory will be studied carefully, and may serve as a

model for building future NATO multinational command and

corps structures.

The Strategic Significance of Longer Warning Time.

The old NATO strategy that called for reinforcing the European

theater with ten U.S. divisions in 10 days is giving way to a

more traditional, but slower mobilization-power projection

and reinforcement strategy. Greater reliance on the

mobilization of reserves both in the United States and Europe

to reinforce smaller standing armies is directly related to

probable warning and response times in cases of future

aggression.

19

K enmnm~num•n i •II n n

Figure 1

6

It is unlikely under present conditions that the Soviet

leadership would contemplate a deliberate attack on NATO. It

is equally improbable that they could achieve either strategic

or tactical surprise. 19 Launching a surprise offensive would

require extensive military preparations and large-scale

movements of forces within CFE regulated military zones and

from east of the Ural Mountains. These activities would provide

unambiguous warning and allow for both crisis management

activities and military preparations. Neither a bolt from the blue

nor a bolt from the grey is likely in the future.

The precise amount of additional warning time is scenario

dependent. Nevertheless, a reasonable planning assumption

against a Soviet theater strategic offensive can now be

measured at the very least in terms of several months.20 Longer

warning scenarios will be possible after the dissolution of the

Warsaw Pact and the retreat of the Soviet forward echelons

along with their entire command, control, and logistical

infrastructure from Eastern Europe. The Soviet General Staff

must now consider how and where to erect a new first echelon.

Their task is further complicated by the terms of a restrictive

CFE Treaty, open rebellion in union republics that want greater

autonomy, and a protracted debate in Moscow over the correct

balance between defensive and offensive military doctrine. 21

Any attempt to bypass restrictions by covertly altering the

balance of conventional forces established under the terms of

the CFE Treaty is virtually impossible thanks to the web of

overlapping methods of verification, confidence-building

measures, and national technical means to monitor Soviet

military activities. At no time in history has any nation's military

infrastructure become so transparent to those whose security

it might put at risk.

The CFE Treaty also provides both legitimacy and

incentives for NATO crisis management activities when

confronted with Soviet violations, especially those that came

during East-West crises and signal strategic warning of

possible aggressive intent. The structural key to NATO crisis

management lies in maintaining specific and adequate forces

designed for: (1) immediae contingencies; (2) early

reinforcement; (3) follow-on reinforcement; and (4) total

20

mobilization. These allied force generation capabilities are

essential for prompt decisionmaking, deterrence, and defeat

of a determined adversary. They were dramatically

demonstrated during the Gulf crisis when nearly 600,000

troops, airmen, and sailors from NATO countries were moved

into the theater of operations.

Parallels between the successful Gulf War and the NATO

theater should not be overdrawn. Nevertheless, for planning

purposes it is instructive to compare the phases of the coalition

buildup, prior to the initiation of the 100-hour land campaign on

February 24. Immediate contingency forces (land, sea, and air)

were dispatched to establish a deterrent force in defense of

Saudi Arabia. The first contingent of U.S. ground forces from

the 82d Airborne Division landed within 30 hours of their alert

on August 8. Within 3 weeks the first armored units arrived as

part of the early reinforcement stage that included all services

to consolidate the defensive phase of the war. Offensive air

operations began on January 17, but follow-on reinforcements

(U.S. Seventh Corps from Germany) coninued to flow into the

theater. By February 24, when the land campaign began, the

transition to the offensive was complete-a transition that

included several massive intratheater deployments which,

combined with large-scale amphibious deception operations,

deprived the Iraqis of tactical warning.

The massive deployment of forces and overpowering

display of firepower and maneuver by all services between

early August and February parallel the escalatory phases and

force structures that would provide NATO with credible

deterrence. There is, however, no consensus in NATO

councils on what force structure may be ideal or affordable. 22

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The transition from a cold war strategy to a new strategy

more appropriate for a diminished Soviet threat against a larger

European Community will be slow and potentially divisive. As

American and European planners undertake the specifics of

military planning they should reflect on NATO's historic center

of gravity-its political cohesion. Unity and consensus building

have provided both the military and political foundations for

21

credible deterrence in Europe. Preserving that unity is more

important than the final outcome of any single element of the

new strategy described above.

The most difficult challenge to NATO unity may be

matching a specific force structure to new strategic concepts.

Force structure remains the life's blood of the alliance. Shaping

it in a manner that preserves consensus, yet leaves a capability

for achieving strategic objectives across the NATO operational

continuum (See Figure 1) requires general measures of

effectiveness against which NATO decisions can be evaluated.

Measures of effectiveness include:

* Demonstrability (forward presence, exercises,

deployment in a crisis)

" Flexibility (force structure that has light to heavy combat

power tailored to the level of threat)

* Mobility (strategic lift to, within, and out of the European

Theater)

* Lethality (lethal munitions, deep strike, high accuracy,

smaller force structure required)

* Command and Control (consolidated command

structures; air/space assets as force multipliers)

" Sustainability (lift, logistics, burden sharing,

prepositioning)

* Affordability (cost-effective combat capabilities based

on optimal mix of high- to mid-level technology in

weapons platforms and munitions)

These generic measures of effectiveness are insufficient

for detailed operational planning, but they are useful tools for

building a general level of consensus within the alliance.

For the United States, the most significant changes are the

reductions in forward deployed forces, greater requirements

for strategic mobility and a greater dependence on allies-both

22

formal and ad hoc-to share not only the military burden, but

also the increasingly salient political and fiscal responsibilities

as well. The United States is unique in the degree to which the

burden-sharing elements of strategy are vital to its future role

in NATO, particularly now that it confronts the post-cold war

world with domestic problems that will, in spite of the dramatic

victory in the Persian Gulf, reduce the resources available for

defense.

If it is true in this regard, that scarcity is the midwife of good

strategy, Washington is entering a golden age of strategic

thinking. The domestic pressures on resources are the result

of a historic convergence of four deficits: (1) the budget deficit

and the political requirements to reduce federal spending; (2)

the trade deficit and attendant requirements to make U.S.

industry competitive on the world market; (3) the social deficit

visible in every congressional district in the form of local

demands for resources in education, law enforcement,

housing, public works (roads and bridges), health care, and

environmental protection and restoration; and (4) the threat

deficit which competes with the surge in domestic demands on

resources-we won the cold war and the Soviet threat to

Europe and to the Third World has retreated in geopolitical and

philosophical defeat.

"Threat deficit" accurately describes the changes in our

relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet, as this threat recedes,

the Third World grows more unstable and volatile, threatening

U.S. and NATO interests with diffuse challenges at constantly

shifting points on the map. The threat deficit may, in fact, prove

to be a shift from a centralized threat of global war to a highly

decentralized threat of diverse regional conflicts that in the

aggregate will require a more versatile and flexible NATO

capability.

The end of the cold war does not mean the end of political,

ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological, and military

rivalries. Neither is it likely to produce an end to the global

struggle for power and influence. Until the "new world order" is

established, the old and familiar NATO Alliance is a prudent

safety net against the twin dangers of international threats and

free-falling defense budgets in capitals, including Washington,

23

that may be pressed by domestic politics to reduce their

commitments to collective defense.

ENDNOTES

1. The first broad outlines of the new strategy appeared in the London

Declaration issued by the heads of state participating in the meeting of the

North Atlantic Council on July 5-6, 1990, and in several speeches by

Supreme Allied Commander, General John R. Galvin. See, for example,

Transcript of SACEUR's Remarks with the Carnegie Endowment For

International Peace, Washington, DC, January 8,1991.

2. Victor Kremenyuk, "Five Years of Perestroika," paper presented at

the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington,

DC, April 13, 1990. The author is an economist at the Institute for the Study

of the United States and Canada in Moscow.

3. Robert Leavitt, "Next Steps for European Arms Reductions," Arms

Control Today, Vol. 21, Number 1, January/February 1991, p. 13.

4. Thomas Graham, Jr., "The CFE Story: Tales From the Negotiating

Table," Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, Number 1, January/February 1991,

p. 10.

5. The brainstorming sessions took place within the North Atlantic

Council (NAC). These produced guidance to the Strategy Review Group

(SRG) chaired by Michael Legge. The SRG produced the draft

political-military strategy which will become the guidance for the NATO

Military Committee (MC) as it develops specific military strategies. The

process was described by Michael Legge in a speech before a SHAPE

Plans and Policy Conference at SHAPE Headquarters, December 13,

1990.

6. Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Under Europe's Umbrella," National Journal,

Vol. 22, No. 14, April 7, 1990, pp. 826-831.

7. George Wilson, "NATO Commander Envisions 'Fire Brigade' Role,"

The Washington Post, December 5,1990, p. 29.

8. Izvestia commentary quoted in The Wall Street Journal, March 4,

1991, p. A5.

9. These issue, are detailed in Douglas T. Stuart's, Can NATO

Transcend Its European Borders?, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 21,1991.

10. Galvin speech, p. 13.

24

11. The London Declaration, mimeographed copy, July 6, 1990, pp.

5-6.

12. This was the conclusion of a Department of Defense study chaired

by Fred Ike and Albert Wohlstetter, Discriminate Deterrence, Washington,

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 1988, pp. 2, 8, 30, 33-35.

13. Discussed by Catherine M Kelleher in "Short-Range Nuclear

Weapons: What Future in Europe?" Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 1,

January/February 1991, pp. 17-21.

14. Philip A. Karber, "Conventional Arms Control, or Why Nunn is

Better Than None," in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thompson, eds.,

Conventional Arms Control and The Security of Europe, Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1988, p. 174.

15. This theme was stressed in many of Ogarkov's publications in the

early 1980s. See, for example, "Reliable Defense to Peace," Red Star,

September 23, 1983, p. 2, and "The Defense of Socialism: the Experience

of History and the Present," Red Star, March 9, 1984, p. 3.

16. Airland Battle envisions mobile forces able to use quick maneuvers

and decentralized execution of offensive missions to put enemy forces on

the defensive. Airland Battle incorporates a deep reconnaissance-strike

system as one component in a comprehensive doctrine that also includes

military operations at the front or points of attack and in rear areas where

enemy forces may have penetrated. Airland Battle stresses the need to plan

for an integrated battlefield--deep, front, and rear. This is a sharp contrast

to its doctrinal predecessor that was exclusively preoccupied with the direct

battle at the front.

17. Kelleher, p. 19.

18. Galvin speech, p. 13.

19. Strategic warning includes notifications or indicators that hostilities

may be imminent. Warnings may be short, in the form of mobilization or the

massing of troops, or long in the case of a hostile state building a large war

industry and army. Tactical warnings are those that provide clues as to the

precise time and place of an armed attack.

20. Fred Ikle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan

Administration, suggests warning time could be measured in years-the

amount of time that it would take to re-Stalinize Eastern Europe. Ironically,

NATO flanks may now be more vulnerable than NATO's old "Central front."

However, aggression here would allow more time for counterdeployments

and reinforcements than a sudden, massive assault against the heart of

Europe. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney commented on the

25

relationship between reduced forward deployment and warning time. "[We

will] rely on Reserves that could be called up and have a few months to get

ready." See Defense Issues, Vol. 5, No. 25, Reprint of Press Conference,

Brussels, May 23, 1990, p. 2.

21. For a detailed analysis of the Soviet options in developing a new

military strategy, see David Glantz, "Soviet Military Strategy in the 1990's:

In Search of a More Rational Approach," paper presented at the Second

Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA,

February 8, 1991.

22. In Washington, the Gulf crisis resulted in a major reevaluation of

force structure and mobilization policy that will affect NATO contingencies.

For example, of the more than 200,000 reserves called to active duty, the

vast majority served in combat support roles such as transportation,

logistics, and medical services. Active-duty forces deployed during the early

reinforcement phase could not have operated without them. However, the

three, high profile Army National Guard combat brigades that were

designated for NATO contingencies in which they were to rapidly reinforce

("Round-out") active duty brigades to form whole divisions were never

deployed. Their state of combat readiness precluded deployment as either

early or follow-on reinforcements. According to Secretary of Defense

Richard Cheney, "It was unrealistic to expect part-time soldiers to maintain

readiness rates as high as their active-duty counterparts.... Instead of using

guard combat brigades in future wars as integral parts of fast-deploying

divisions, they might better be organized into their own divisions that would

be expected to train 90 to 120 days before being sent into battle." See,

Barton Gellman, "Cheney Says Guard Units May Need Reorganizing," The

Washington Post, March 15, 1991, p. 34. Without increased warning time

in the European theater, Secretary Cheney's radical departure from

long-standing mobilization policies would be inconceivable. However, with

both increased warning time and fewer active forces, reliance on reserves

is credible for both NATO and global contingencies provided that active duty

forces are adequate for immediate contingencies, early reinforcement (with

reserve combat service and support), and backed by reserve divisions that

are designated as follow-on reinforcements, but with 90 to 120 days training

available between mobilization and deployment.

26

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Mbjor General Padl G. Cerjan

C -nrnaf

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Karl W. Robinson

Author

Dr. Gary L Guertner

Editor

Wr& Niarlanne P. Cowling

Secretary

MsL Patricia A. Bonrmeu


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