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NATO Strategy
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Gary L. Guertner
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NATO Strategy in a New World Order
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Guertner, Gary L.
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FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP NATO; Wurope; security regime;
European security
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverseif necessary and identify by block number) This study examines the new strategy that is slowly taking shape within the
alliance, and the role that NATO is most likely to play within a larger European
security regime where responsibilities may be shared with other European
multination organizations--the European Community (EC), the Western European
Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
for example.
These and other organizations, the author contends, may compete, evolve,
engage in cooperative ventures, even merge. Their collective challenge is to
accommodate Europe's emergence from a U.S.-dominated security umbrella (NATO)
while maintaining an American presence in a new political-economic-security
order. The outcome will be determined through a slow, iterative process driven
by either declining or resurgent threats, and compromises among states over
divergent domestic agendas, limited willingness to relinquish national bover)
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sovereignty, suspicions between large and small commitments states, and varying to the American trans-Atlantic relationship.
NATO STRATEGY IN A NEW WORLD ORDER
Gary L. Guertner
April 10, 1991
DISCLAIMER
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and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. Government. This report is approved for public
release; distribution unlimited.
COMMENTS
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FOREWORD
American military forces contributed to the victories in two
European wars and in a protracted cold war. Victory, however,
has not ended the U.S. commitment to NATO or to European
security. On the contrary, the post-cold war world confronts the
alliance with an even broader range of security issues. This
study examines the new strategy that is slowly taking shape
within the alliance, and the role that NATO is most likely to play
within a larger European security regime where responsibilities
may be shared with other European multination
organizations-the European Community (EC), the Western
European Union (WEU), and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for example.
These and other organizations, the author argues, may
compete, evolve, engage in cooperative ventures, even
merge. Their collective challenge is to accommodate Europe's
emergence from a U.S.-dominated security umbrella (NATO)
while maintaining an American presence in a new
political-economic-security order. The outcome will be
determined through a slow, iterative process driven by either
declining or resurgent threats, and compromises among states
over divergent domestic agendas, limited willingness to
relinquish national sovereignty, suspicions between large and
small states, and varying commitments to the American trans-
Atlantic relationship.
The author would like to thank Mrs. Marianne Cowling and
Colonels David Jablonsky, John J. Hickey, Jr., Robert R. Ulin,
Phillip W. Mock, and Donald E. Lunday for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present this
study as part of the continuing debate over NATO strategy and
the U.S. commitment to European security.
KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF THE AUTHOR
GARY L. GUERTNER is the Director of Research at the
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He holds
B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from the University
of Arizona and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the
Claremont Graduate School. A former Marine Corps officer
and veteran of Vietnam, Dr. Guertner has also served on the
staff of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
as a Professor of Political Science at the University of
California, Fullerton. His latest book is Deterrence and Defense
in a Post-Nuclear World (St. Martin's, 1990).
iv
NATO STRATEGY
IN A NEW WORLD ORDER
The most immediate threat to Western Europe during the
cold war was the shadow of Soviet military superiority looming
from the East, proscribing Western political and economic
freedom. NATO and its link to U.S. military power deterred
political intimidation as well as a less probable military thrust
into Western Europe. But these threats have faded under
Mikhail Gorbachev, replaced by revolutions in Eastern Europe,
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, receding Soviet military
power, German unification, and the stirring of political and
economic freedom nurtured by the West.
These events are linked directly to the Gorbachev domestic
revolution, a revolution that depends not only on domestic
change, but equally on political-economic integration with the
West and dramatic shifts from defense to domestic investment.
New Soviet military thinking, arms control, and unilateral cuts
in Soviet conventional force structure are dramatic in
themselves. But when projected on a new map of Europe,
these events call for a major reexamination of NATO military
strategy and the future role of the U.S. military in a revised
NATO.
A new strategy for NATO has been quietly taking shape
since 1989, the debate often muffled by more dramatic events
in the Soviet Union and more recently by war in the Persian
Gulf. By the spring of 1991 the broad outlines of a new NATO
within a radically new European security regime began to
emerge.1 This study assesses both the emerging new strategy
and the larger European security environment in which it will
evolve.
THE CHANGING THREAT
American military forces have contributed to the victories
in two wars and in a protracted cold war. Victory, however, does
not end a commitment. On the contrary, victory in the cold war
1
has left the United States with new as well as old interests and
objectives in Europe. These include:
* Political stability
* Deterrence of residual Soviet threats
• Deterrence of intra-regional conflict in Eastern Europe
* Economic participation in European markets
* Preservation of newly emerging democratic
governments
The continuity of U.S.-European relations will lie in
Washington's ability to formulate a new strategy for the
continued linkage of American and European security. The
framework of that strategy must include clearly articulated
objectives and strategic concepts for achieving those
objectives when they are confronted with a range of evolving
threats.
The immediate and urgent Soviet problem is economic
recovery. Soviet military forces had to be reduced to finance
economic reform. We should not, however, underestimate the
risks that unilateral withdrawals of military forces from Eastern
Europe, the CFE, and the START treaties entailed for
Gorbachev. Historically, the Soviet Union depended
disproportionately on its military might for superpower status.
Previous Soviet leaders assumed the convertibility of military
power to diplomatic, economic, and psychological gains
consistent with Soviet desires to extend their influence. The
size and sophistication of Soviet forces historically have been
the most visible product of industrial modernization, and they
have conveyed the trappings of success. In Soviet eyes,
respect and authority must certainly spill over to their political
and ideological claims.
Gorbachev openly challenged these sacred assumptions.
Security, he has argued, and by inference superpower status,
cannot rest on military power alone. Political and economic
cooperation with the West is an essential part of state security
2
in the nuclear age. The Gorbachev domestic agenda signaled
a new, more cooperative phase in Soviet-American relations
and ultimately a stronger, more competitive Soviet industrial
base. No one can say, however, whether a rehabilitated Soviet
socioeconomic system will spawn a more assertive foreign
policy or a status quo mentality anxious to preserve the benefits
of reduced tensions abroad and higher living standards at
home.
The logic of Gorbachev's reform strategy suggests that
Soviet national interests would be served in the preservation
of a cooperative, economically integrated international order
that aids and abets economic perestroika. But two undesirable
outcomes are also possible-a reconstituted technological
base and assertive military or, at the other extreme, total failure
and systemic collapse accompanied by accelerating violence
and separatist tendencies within the USSR. Either could
confront NATO with novel and unforeseen challenges. Neither
is compatible with U.S. or European interests. Responding to
a technologically revived Soviet military requires significantly
different measures than those needed to confront the
pressures resulting from a breakdown of authority and potential
civil war or revolution. The Soviet political system is in the early
phases of a profound revolution, the final phase of which
cannot be predicted. Systemic collapse, a conservative
restoration of power, or political instability throughout the
Soviet Union seem more likely than successful perestroika in
the next 10-15 years.
A worst-case scenario posited by Soviet reformers is a
Soviet Union that is trapped in the same political-economic
trends as Germany in the 1920s. In Weimar Germany, fragile
democratic institutions failed to reverse the hopeless economic
conditions from which radical nationalist movements grew and
seized power. A Soviet version would be a "nightmare for the
Soviet Union and Europe. 2
NATO should, therefore, aim for capabilities that afford
maximum flexibility to meet residual Soviet military threats as
well as new threats to the political stability of Europe. It would
be shortsighted and dangerous to truncate NATO's military
capabilities irreversibly at the precise moment that traditional
3
nationalisms are reappearing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union is balancing between chaos and repression. Throughout
the former "Eastern bloc" and in a united Germany, there
remain the problems of reconciling geography, historic
territorial claims and fears of hegemony, with the political
requirements for European stability. NATO's contribution in
some form to that stability remains indispensable, because
even after CFE and follow-on arms control treaties are
implemented. Europe will remain the most heavily armed
continent on earth, with millions of troops and tens of
thousands of tanks deployed there. The 20,000 tanks CFE
permits each group of countries (NATO and the former
members of the Warsaw Pact) to retain is nearly five times the
number Nazi Germany had wh.n World War II began.3
Europeans themselves have acknowledged potential
long-term, non-Soviet threats in several little nuticed provisions
of the CFE Treaty signed at the Paris Summit of the 34-nation
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on
November 19, 1990. For example, the British and French
insisted on the Article VII provision that imposes national as
well as alliance limitations. These provisions recognize that
existing alliances will not last in their current form forever.
Moreover, the limitations on individual countries within NATO
as well as on former members of the Warsaw Pact were
matched by provisions for a comprehensive verification
regime. The treaty permits not only alliance to alliance (formally
called "groups of countries" in the treaty) inspection, but also
allows each country to inspect any other member of its own
"group."4 The British, for example, may inspect German
installations, Germans may inspect the French, Hungarians
may inspect Poland. No signatory may deny on-site
inspections to any other signator.
These examples reflect a sober long-term perspective by
individual signatories. The precise means for maintaining
stability in Europe, however, will depend on the structure of and
relationships between emerging organizations that will
compete for roles in a future European security regime.
4
NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURES
Changes in NATO strategy have always come gradually,
patiently shaped by balancing change with the consensus
building that is always vital to political cohesion and credible
coalition deterrence. NATO today is experiencing
unprecedented change in its grand strategy as well as in
alliance military strategy. Grand strategy encompasses all
aspects of NATO strategy-political, economic and military.
New architecture and military strategy will emerge in an
environment that must continue to satisfy simultaneously the
strategic objectives, individual political agendas, and domestic
constraints of member nations. The European Big Four
(Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) for example,
simultaneously want a strong European pillar, reduced
American influence, and long-term guarantees against the
hegemony of a single state or coalition. Small states want a
U.S. presence that balances the European Big Four. Flank
staLes (Norway and Turkey, for example) want no transfer of
power or responsibilities to other European institutions such as
the European Community (EC), Western European Union
(WEU), or the CSCE.
New and old European institutions are competing for
prominent positions in a new European security regime. NATO,
however, remains the dominant and most bureaucratically
powerful institution as well as the principal institution that
legitimizes the essential North American, trans-Atlantic military
link to European security. NATO is also the only institution that
is formulatingj a broad new grand strategy.
The first significant steps were incorporated in the July
1990 London Declaration, which affirmed nw elements of a
strategy that included smaller forces, lowered readiness,
multinationality, less reliance on nuclear forces, an arms
control regime, and mutual security. The London Declaration
literally kicked off "brainstorming" sessions within Alliance
Councils which, in turn, fed a major strategy review.. This
review produced a political-military strategy which, in turn,
provides guidance to the NATO Military Committee (MC) from
which specific operational concepts are derived. At this writing,
5
a broad political strategy has emerged from which tentative
conclusions may be drawn about the military strategies that are
most likely to be developed in support of it.
The old strategy that placed emphasis on the deterrence of
war and defense of territory is being redirected to a strategy
that deals with a broader operational continuum from
peacetime operations to crisis management to war. The new
strategy assumes an arms control regime composed of a
matrix of treaties and confidence building measures, and the
reduced forward presence of military forces. It also assumes
that NATO must develop new relationships with other
European multinational institutions that may acquire security
and defense roles, especially for non-NATO states in a more
fully integrated European community. Figure 1 illustrates which
of these institutions is most likely to play a significant role, with
NATO, across the continuum from peace to war. Whatever
may happen, however, it seems almost certain that as issues
cross the continuum from peace through crisis to war,
institutional responsibility will narrow and NATO will remain the
dominant organizational instrument on which European
security will ultimately depend.
EVOLVING STRATEGY AND STRUCTURES
PEACE - CRISIS ----- WAR
CSCE CSCE NATO
COUNCIL OF EUROPE WEU WEU*
EC NATO
WEU
NATO
* WEU FOR OUT-Co-THEATER OPERATIONS ONLY
Figure 1
6
There is no question that in a post-cold war Europe, NATO
will share responsibilities with other multinational institutions.
CSCE, for example, may evolve into the major peacetime
Pan-European political forum. The EC may expand its Western
European Base, acquiring new interests in security issues as
it grows. The emerging EC preference, particularly in Bonn and
Paris, is to broaden the organization's mandate to include a
common European defense policy. The WEU may evolve as
the principal European security pillar, bridging NATO and the
EC. Both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand have
endorsed the organic relationship between the EC and WEU,
and a strong European pillar under which more active French
military participation in European defense would be acceptable
to Paris.
The WEU may also play a key role in future out-of-area
contingencies and operations discussed below. All of the major
bodies illustrated in Figure 2 function to promote and reinforce
European integration. They are analogous to retail outlets in
- EUROPEAN
SECURITY
NATO E EC
(16) _ (12)
WEU COUNCI OF EUROPE
(9)
MILITARY PO CAL ECONOMIC
SECURITY STITY ,- PROSPERITY
EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY REGIME
Figure 2
7
an open security market. As such, they may compete, evolve,
engage in cooperative ventures, even merge. Their collective
challenge is to accommodate Europe's emergence from a
U.S.-dominated security umbrella while maintaining an
American presence in a new political-economic-security order.
The outcome will be determined through a slow, iterative
process driven by either declining or resurgent threats, and
compromises among states over divergent internal agendas,
limited willingness to relinquish national sovereignty,
suspicions between large and small states, varying
commitments to the trans-Atlantic relationship, and perhaps
even the difficulty of integrating "neutral" states in a new
European security regime.
PEACETIME MISSIONS FOR NATO
NATO peacetime functions inevitably will be subordinated
to other European institutions that will lead political and
economic changes. NATO's organizational structure,
bureaucratic skills, and credibility born of four decades of
experience can, however, give the alliance a major role as the
guardian of a growing arms control/confidence building regime
and multilateral deterrent that will remain vital to the long-term
stability of Europe.
Paradoxically, a liberal-conservative anti-NATO coalition
has emerged in the American Congress. Conservatives see
U.S. troop withdrawal as a logical consequence of the reduced
Soviet military threat. Liberals maintain that Europeans are
financially capable of providing for their own defense.6 While
the major thrust of their arguments is true, it is equally true that
the U.S. presence in NATO has always had political as well as
military objectives. The size and scope of U.S. military
presence will continue to diminish, but the political, as well as
security benefits of NATO will continue to justify a significant
U.S. role.
Military presence will link the United States to European
stability, deter both intra-regional conflicts and residual Soviet
conventional threats, ease fears of a hegemonic Germany, and
provide the United States with leverage for its economic
interests-interests that are potential sources of acrimony
8
between the two continents. Getting a foot in the economic
door is considerably easier when you remain firmly committed
to an evolving European security regime.
More directly, NATO will have a major peacetime mission
in cooperative ventures with CSCE in monitoring the current
arms control regime (INF and CFE Treaties) and negotiating
additional treaties. NATO is also organized to support a wide
range of confidence-building measures and military-to-military
contacts including:
* Military exchanges and seminars
* Joint officer education
* Cooperative exercises
* Joint plans for disaster relief and environmental
clean-up
* Contingency planning against international terrorism
* Intelligence sharing for counternarcotics operations
These missions alone do not justify maintaining an
elaborate collective defense under NATO. Peacetime
operations serve only as a reminder that NATO's primary
mission is deterrence during an evolutionary process. Its
objective continues to be collective defense in the
cost-effective, burden-sharing sense of the term as well as
resisting trends toward the nationalizing of defense policies,
trends from which rogue states historically have emerged to
threaten European security.
From the Soviet perspective, peacetime missions for
NATO that emphasize cooperation with the East and the
reduction of all NATO forces in the Central Region through the
CFE process help Soviet reformers play to conservative
constituents. This includes the military, already unhappy and
fighting rear guard actions against the prospect of reductions
in the Soviet strategic arsenal, the evacuation of Soviet forces
from East Europe, and a reunified Germany in NATO.
9
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND WAR
Crisis management and war are the mid- and extreme
points on NATO's emerging operational continuum. Crisis
resolution, the successful outcome of crisis management,
requires not only skillful diplomacy, but also a security
architecture backed by credible military capabilities.
Deterrence of conflict and intimidation remains the central
objective in at least four exclusive NATO functions:
* Deter and defend against residual threats from the
Soviet Union.
" Deter and defend against threats from countries other
than the Soviet Union (both in the European theater and
out-of-area operations).
" Preserve the strategic balance within Europe,
especially against the Soviets.
" Serve as a trans-Atlantic forum for consultation on
security issues.
Although most of these objectives are familiar, their
success in a new Europe required shedding many "sacred
cows" embodied in old NATO planning documents such as
Military Committee Document 14/3 (flexible response) and
related perennial debates over nuclear modernization. Figure
3 contrasts NATO's old strategic concepts and environment
with the "new thinking." The analysis that follows expands on
these new elements of strategy.
General Defense. As European security becomes more
fully integrated, new operational concepts will have to address
a broader spectrum of contingencies and more specialized
forces to meet threats from residual Soviet military power to
intra-European conflict, terrorism, and low- to mid-intensity
operations outside the region that may have a major impact on
European and U.S. interests.
Short-term changes in NATO strategy should avoid steps
which in fact or perception isolate the Soviet Union at a time of
domestic turmoil and political factionalism. Isolation is likely to
10
NATO STRATEGYWHAT
HAS CHANGED
OLD NEW
* SPECIFIC THREAT 0 GENERAL DEFENSE
" FORWARD DEFENSE 0 REDUCED FORWARD PRESENCE
* FIXED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS 0 MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY
* FLEXIBLE RESPONSE/EARLY USE 0 LAST RESORT
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
* NATIONAL FORMATIONS 0 MULTINATIONAL FORMATIONS
* SMALLER RESERVES/RAPID 0 GREATER RELIANCE ON RESERVES
MOBILIZATION
" SHORT WARNING 0 LONGER WARNING TIME
Figure 3
strengthen repressive forces, reinforcing their traditional siege
mentality at the expense of reformers who favor greater Soviet
political and economic integration with the West. This requires
both the peacetime, cooperative mission described above and
a pragmatic posture towards Moscow that supports
evolutionary change in the Soviet internal empire without
strident calls for the dissolution of the USSR. Threats arising
from Soviet domestic volatility or Soviet counterparts in
Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia and Romania, most notably) can
be contained or even deterred through active NATO
collaboration with other organizations that emerge in the new
European security regime, and with a continued U.S. presence
that provides both symbol and substance for an American
guarantee to the security of its European allies - old and new.
Perhaps the most immediate concern associated with
NATO's shift to a more general, post-cold war defense posture
is the issue of out-of-area operations. This recurring and
divisive issue resurfaced early in the Gulf crisis when the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John R. Galvin,
argued that NATO should adopt a new "fire brigade" strategy
11
designed to facilitate rapid deployment beyond the existing
NATO Treaty area.7 "Fire brigades" represent a significant
evolution in Washington's original preference for a
geographically delimited alliance so that it could pursue its cold
war interests without the interference of junior allies, and, at
the same time, not be drawn into their overseas adventures.
By contrast, the "New World Order" of the 1990s requires
burden sharing not only in its economic sense, but also
because broad, collective action is required to legitimize the
use of force. As the Gulf War demonstrated, even the collective
action of NATO members was possible only because it took
place in support of United Nations resolutions and under WEU
coordination. Even this did not satisfy Soviet conservative
commentators who fear that the allied victory means NATO will
see itself as the world's policeman and will present a greater
danger than ever to the Soviet Union. 8
Old guard Soviet fears may be justified in terms of NATO
capabilities. General Galvin's concept for out-of-area
operations has, in fact, been dramatically put to the test. Two
of the ten American divisions (Seventh Corps representing 50
percent of the American forces stationed in Western Europe)
that fought in the Gulf were deployed from Europe, along with
one French division and also a British division with Royal Air
Force units deployed directly from Germany.
It is misleading, however, to suggest that the deployment
of NATO forces to the Gulf War represented a common view
within the alliance. In fact, a divisive debate ensued throughout
the crisis, and strains on the alliance were avoided, as they
have been in the past, by ad hoc arrangements among
consenting members and the appearance of passive solidarity
by nonparticipants.
NATO members were united in support of economic
sanctions against Iraq, but quickly split between the U.S.-UK
bloc which was preparing for war and a European-Canadian
bloc which favored a diplomatic solution. These factions
nonetheless demonstrated caution and moderation in their
handling of these policy differences, due to a common concern
that the alliance might not survive a recriminatory public
12
dispute over the Kuwait issue in an era of declining Soviet
threat.9
A lesson of the Gulf War was that European governments
which chose to support military operations coordinated their
policies under the auspices of the WEU rather than NATO.
They recognized the value of bolstering the "European Pillar"
of the NATO Alliance both to accommodate the American
pressure for burden sharing and as an expression of individual
regional security consciousness. Because military cooperation
was easier to achieve within the WEU, it is likely to gain support
as the bridge (or safety valve) between NATO and individual
members who desire to move European security policies
beyond the narrowly defined cold war boundaries of NATO
collective defense.
Forward Presence, Mobility and Flexibility. Forward
defense, the NATO concept of defending at the inter-German
border without trading space for time, seems conceptually
archaic today. Like busts of Lenin in Warsaw, old strategic
concepts are being replaced by the symbols of a new Europe.
The precise shape, size, or disposition of post-cold war NATO
forces in Europe is not clearly visible, but there is no doubt that
their numbers will be radically reduced and they will be
deployed over a wider area, obscuring familiar landmarks such
as NATO's "Center" and "Flanks."
Reduced forces, including an American presence that may
fall from an estimated 300,000 troops assigned to Europe to
below 100,000 deployed in a corps (two divisions) and several
Air Force wings, will require new doctrine and operational
concepts built around mobility. In war, they will require the
capacity to bring both air and ground forces swiftly to bear
against concentrations of hostile forces on a nonlinear
battlefield.
Mobility is vital at both the strategic and operational levels.
Strategic mobility is the air- and sea-lift capability to move
forces from the United States to Europe, or, as in the Gulf War,
from the United States and Europe to another theater.
Operational mobility was dramatically demonstrated by
coalition forces that outflanked the Iraqi army in two days with
13
nearly 200,000 troops in two heavy corps. But operational
mobility is more than wheels on combat forces. It includes
every functional asset required to sustain combat
operations-logistics, combat service support, air defense,
counter air, and the ability to suppress the mobility of the other
side.
The minimum operational force capable of executing these
missions is, according to General Galvin, a U.S. Corps.
Anything less denies the United States operational flexibility
and strategic planning in war. "That," in the worst sense of the
term, would constitute "an entangling alliance." 10
In peace, U.S. forces must be deployed in a fashion
consistent with German sovereignty and German sensitivities
to "singularization" in the sense that Germany not remain the
host for the bulk of allied forces. Harmonizing national force
structures with an alliance that assumes new peacetime
missions and at the same time must provide credible
deterrence in and out of the European theater will be
successfully accomplished only if the alliance can agree on
other mutually supporting strategic concepts that are changing
as dramatically as forward defense.
"Last Resort": The New Flexible Response. Declaratory
changes in flexible response announced at the London
meeting of the North Atlantic council mark the transition from
a nuclear-dominant American NATO pillar to a
nonnuclear-dominant European pillar. "There will be,"
according to the London Declaration, "a significantly reduced
role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range... in
the transformed Europe, they (the allies] will be able to adopt
a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of
last resort."1
"Sub-strategic nuclear systems" or short-range nuclear
forces (SNF) represent the critical link between conventional
defense in Europe and escalation to strategic nuclear
exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The American nuclear umbrella has not necessarily been
removed, but it has become less relevant because of the
reduced risk of attack by massive Soviet ground forces that
14
would have triggered the chain of escalation embodied in the
old NATO strategy.
Old flexible response, in theory, was an initial defense of
Europe with conventional forces. In practice, political
requirements within the alliance resulted in a more ambiguous
strategy. Flexible response did not threaten precise timetables
for escalation from conventioal to nuclear war. NATO's exact
response to aggression confronted Soviet planners with three
possible responses if deterrence failed: (1) "Effective defense"
by conventional forces; (2) the threat of early escalation to
nuclear weapons; and (3) the threat of nuclear retaliation
against Soviet territory. Confronted with a credible NATO force
structure, Soviet leaders could not be certain which level of
response their actions, even if limited to conventional forces,
might trigger.
Deterrence of nuclear war between the United States and
the USSR was directly linked to NATO strategy for deterring
war in Europe. Europe was the crucible from which nuclear
escalation would be triggered. Strategic coupling of U.S.
nuclear weapons with European security has been the
dominant factor in NATO strategy for 40 years. Strategy
evolved, but its evolution always centered on how best to
structure credible extended deterrence by linking the American
infantryman in Europe to U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.
Ambiguity in the form of prewar threats to escalate conflict
to nuclear strikes on Soviet territory strengthened deterrence.
For Americans, however, strategic coupling, forward defense,
and reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons were among
the least obstructed paths to intercontinental nuclear war if
deterrence failed. Together they became an escalation trap
that stripped away all pretense of crisis management. A
strategy that depended on rapid escalation to intercontinental
nuclear exchanges was credible only for extreme
contingencies such as massive Soviet conventional and
nuclear attacks across a broad front in Europe and/or against
the United States. 12
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the signing of the
CFE Treaty undercut these long-standing Western
15
requirements for early nuclear escalation. There is no longer
any overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority to be offset
by nuclear weapons. Moreover, many, if not all, Soviet SNF
have been reportedly redeployed to the Russian republic; no
former ally in the Warsaw Pact is a willing host, and the
non-Russian republics pose growing security risks.13
Soviet withdrawals mean the elimination of a large portion
of the fixed targets that drove the size of NATO nuclear
deployments. In the unlikely event of a Soviet attack in the near
future, NATO's principal targets would be Soviet forces
crossing back into Eastern Europe and their supporting bases.
Such targets would be more suitable for conventional weapons
that are politically acceptable in peacetime, immediately
responsive in a conflict, and more discriminant and effective if
available in sufficient numbers.
Extended deterrence in the form of military presence
requires credible U.S. efforts to assist NATO allies in their own
defense, in Europe. Under current political conditions, strategic
coupling of that defense to U.S. strategic nuclear weapons is
neither a prudent strategy for Americans nor a reasonable
expectation for Europeans. The nuclear umbrella is a symbol
of the cold war. Attempts to hold it over a revolutionary new
Europe will only succeed in strengthening those factions on
both sides of the Atlantic who will use it as an excuse for not
supporting conventional deterrence in Europe. The result could
produce self-deterrence and political impotence.
A continuing American presence and conventional
weapons modernization under CFE limitations that provide a
range of options from mid-intensity conflict (in or out of the
European theater) to the massive firepower required to deter
residual Soviet capabilities will provide the most credible
deterrent to Europe's most likely conflicts in the first decades
of the 21 st century.
The most important objective for NATO in an expanding
European security regime is to achieve stable deterrence by
denying Soviet (or others in the future) capabilities for shortwarning
attack, and the embodiment of that threat in large
numbers of armored divisions and artillery. These have
traditionally been "the root of military instability in Europe., 14
16
These broad objectives have and should continue to be
pursued through a three-pronged strategy that reduces the
requirements for nuclear weapons. The first is arms control
(CFE, INF and perhaps SNF) to reduce offensive structure; the
second is the confidence building and arms control verification
regimes that, together with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact
and withdrawal of Soviet forces behind their own borders,
restrict operational capabilities; and the third is conventional
arms modernization of residual NATO forces.
Conventional arms modernization and new military
doctrine are inextricably linked in U.S. Airland Battle concepts.
Airland Battle integrates modern high-tech weapons and
operational mobility to strike anywhere on the battlefield. It is
defined by smart bombs, stealth fighters, short-range tactical
missile systems (ATACMS) and the Multiple Launched Rocket
System (MLRS) both with "smart" submunitions, helicopters,
air assault forces, modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles;
all linked and directed by space and airborne warning and
target acquisition systems. These are the weapons, the
doctrine, and the technologies that former Soviet Army Chief
of Staff, Marshall N.V. Ogarkov predicted during their early
testing phases would give "conventional forces on the
defensive the same degree of lethality as battlefield nuclear
weapons. "15
To a degree, the worst fears of Marshall Ogarkov and his
successors were realized in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait
when U.S.-led coalition forces devastated a former Soviet ally
along with thousands of Soviet tanks, artillery units, air defense
systems, and other equipment. The Iraqi test-bed for U.S. hightech
conventional forces and the doctrinal capabilities of
Airland Battle against a numerically superior force strengthens
the position of those who argue that NATO's new military
strategy should adopt similar operational concepts for the
defense of Europe. 16
The imperatives for conventional deterrence are further
underscored by U.S. and NATO decisions to forgo
modernization of the Lance surface-to-surface nuclear missile
(FOTL) and nuclear artillery shells. Moreover, no NATO capital
appears willing to host any new nuclear system, including the
17
problem-plagued tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) that
was to have been deployed on U.S. aircraft in Germany and
the United Kingdom. 17
SNF negotiations are compelling to NATO allies who want
a process that formally binds all parties, and provides a
defense against political reversals. The prospects for an SNF
agreement, however, were much better before the Gorbachev
peace offensive was derailed by internal problems. The
conservative party-military backsliding in other arms control
fora (CFE and START) suggests that SNF negotiations may
become a solution in search of a problem. Tacit bargaining and
informal agreements may be more expedient. At worst, the
level of political uncertainty in the Soviet Union means the
uncontroversial retention of current NATO air-delivered
nuclear weapons. The withdrawal of Soviet SNF and air
defenses from Eastern Europe means that a small, airdeliverable
theater nuclear arsenal and conventional missiles
and smart weapons can credibly hold Soviet targets at risk.
NATO's greatest obstacle may be more political than
military-namely, its nuclear addiction as a substitute for
conventional deterrence.
Multinational Formations. The massive changes in
NATO's political-military strategy require a new stationing
regime that reflects both the reductions in forward deployed
forces and sensitivity to German sovereignty. The traditional
high concentration and visibility of American and allied forces
in Germany with all of their associated, obtrusive training and
overflight activities must change if a domestic political backlash
is to be avoided. The most probable solution to these and
related problems is the creation of multinational formations that
are more widely dispersed within the NATO theater.
The concept of multinational forces in NATO has always
been present in the sense that national forces were designated
to fight under a common command at predesignated sectors
of the old inter-German border. There has also been functional
or specialized multinationality such as the crews aboard
AWACS and the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force
which has the mission to move light forces rapidly in a crisis.
18
General Galvin favors the corps as the basic U.S. combat
effective, operational force. 18 Corps have infinite flexibility for
the creation of multinational units in that they may be built from
divisions, brigades, or combinations of the two. Multinational
corps in NATO would reduce the costs of U.S. presence by
streamlining command structures and spreading support
requirements among allies. Washington, however, may insist
that its post-CFE forces remain in a single corps, reinforced by
units of other allies. Dispersing limited U.S. resources would
make strategic planning and out-of-theater operations more
difficult.
A multinational corps structure for NATO need not be
controversial or rigid. Its design should accommodate the
mobilization and reinforcement capabilities of individual allies.
During the transition from crisis to war, NATO could, for
examole, be reinforced by a quick reaction U.S. Corps, or
prepianned brigade packages from several allies could merge
in predesignated European assembly areas. In war. a detailed
mix of national, binational, and multinational corps could
quickly be brought to bear against any conceivable fcrce.
The Gulf crisis demonstrated the potency of the multinational
corps concept when, with little prior planning, the
British First Armored Division fought under the command of the
U S. Seventh Corps, and, astonishingly to many, the French
Sixth Light Armored Division fought under the U.S. Eighteenth
Airborne Corps. The Gulf experience and its decisive allied
military victory will be studied carefully, and may serve as a
model for building future NATO multinational command and
corps structures.
The Strategic Significance of Longer Warning Time.
The old NATO strategy that called for reinforcing the European
theater with ten U.S. divisions in 10 days is giving way to a
more traditional, but slower mobilization-power projection
and reinforcement strategy. Greater reliance on the
mobilization of reserves both in the United States and Europe
to reinforce smaller standing armies is directly related to
probable warning and response times in cases of future
aggression.
19
K enmnm~num•n i •II n n
Figure 1
6
It is unlikely under present conditions that the Soviet
leadership would contemplate a deliberate attack on NATO. It
is equally improbable that they could achieve either strategic
or tactical surprise. 19 Launching a surprise offensive would
require extensive military preparations and large-scale
movements of forces within CFE regulated military zones and
from east of the Ural Mountains. These activities would provide
unambiguous warning and allow for both crisis management
activities and military preparations. Neither a bolt from the blue
nor a bolt from the grey is likely in the future.
The precise amount of additional warning time is scenario
dependent. Nevertheless, a reasonable planning assumption
against a Soviet theater strategic offensive can now be
measured at the very least in terms of several months.20 Longer
warning scenarios will be possible after the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact and the retreat of the Soviet forward echelons
along with their entire command, control, and logistical
infrastructure from Eastern Europe. The Soviet General Staff
must now consider how and where to erect a new first echelon.
Their task is further complicated by the terms of a restrictive
CFE Treaty, open rebellion in union republics that want greater
autonomy, and a protracted debate in Moscow over the correct
balance between defensive and offensive military doctrine. 21
Any attempt to bypass restrictions by covertly altering the
balance of conventional forces established under the terms of
the CFE Treaty is virtually impossible thanks to the web of
overlapping methods of verification, confidence-building
measures, and national technical means to monitor Soviet
military activities. At no time in history has any nation's military
infrastructure become so transparent to those whose security
it might put at risk.
The CFE Treaty also provides both legitimacy and
incentives for NATO crisis management activities when
confronted with Soviet violations, especially those that came
during East-West crises and signal strategic warning of
possible aggressive intent. The structural key to NATO crisis
management lies in maintaining specific and adequate forces
designed for: (1) immediae contingencies; (2) early
reinforcement; (3) follow-on reinforcement; and (4) total
20
mobilization. These allied force generation capabilities are
essential for prompt decisionmaking, deterrence, and defeat
of a determined adversary. They were dramatically
demonstrated during the Gulf crisis when nearly 600,000
troops, airmen, and sailors from NATO countries were moved
into the theater of operations.
Parallels between the successful Gulf War and the NATO
theater should not be overdrawn. Nevertheless, for planning
purposes it is instructive to compare the phases of the coalition
buildup, prior to the initiation of the 100-hour land campaign on
February 24. Immediate contingency forces (land, sea, and air)
were dispatched to establish a deterrent force in defense of
Saudi Arabia. The first contingent of U.S. ground forces from
the 82d Airborne Division landed within 30 hours of their alert
on August 8. Within 3 weeks the first armored units arrived as
part of the early reinforcement stage that included all services
to consolidate the defensive phase of the war. Offensive air
operations began on January 17, but follow-on reinforcements
(U.S. Seventh Corps from Germany) coninued to flow into the
theater. By February 24, when the land campaign began, the
transition to the offensive was complete-a transition that
included several massive intratheater deployments which,
combined with large-scale amphibious deception operations,
deprived the Iraqis of tactical warning.
The massive deployment of forces and overpowering
display of firepower and maneuver by all services between
early August and February parallel the escalatory phases and
force structures that would provide NATO with credible
deterrence. There is, however, no consensus in NATO
councils on what force structure may be ideal or affordable. 22
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The transition from a cold war strategy to a new strategy
more appropriate for a diminished Soviet threat against a larger
European Community will be slow and potentially divisive. As
American and European planners undertake the specifics of
military planning they should reflect on NATO's historic center
of gravity-its political cohesion. Unity and consensus building
have provided both the military and political foundations for
21
credible deterrence in Europe. Preserving that unity is more
important than the final outcome of any single element of the
new strategy described above.
The most difficult challenge to NATO unity may be
matching a specific force structure to new strategic concepts.
Force structure remains the life's blood of the alliance. Shaping
it in a manner that preserves consensus, yet leaves a capability
for achieving strategic objectives across the NATO operational
continuum (See Figure 1) requires general measures of
effectiveness against which NATO decisions can be evaluated.
Measures of effectiveness include:
* Demonstrability (forward presence, exercises,
deployment in a crisis)
" Flexibility (force structure that has light to heavy combat
power tailored to the level of threat)
* Mobility (strategic lift to, within, and out of the European
Theater)
* Lethality (lethal munitions, deep strike, high accuracy,
smaller force structure required)
* Command and Control (consolidated command
structures; air/space assets as force multipliers)
" Sustainability (lift, logistics, burden sharing,
prepositioning)
* Affordability (cost-effective combat capabilities based
on optimal mix of high- to mid-level technology in
weapons platforms and munitions)
These generic measures of effectiveness are insufficient
for detailed operational planning, but they are useful tools for
building a general level of consensus within the alliance.
For the United States, the most significant changes are the
reductions in forward deployed forces, greater requirements
for strategic mobility and a greater dependence on allies-both
22
formal and ad hoc-to share not only the military burden, but
also the increasingly salient political and fiscal responsibilities
as well. The United States is unique in the degree to which the
burden-sharing elements of strategy are vital to its future role
in NATO, particularly now that it confronts the post-cold war
world with domestic problems that will, in spite of the dramatic
victory in the Persian Gulf, reduce the resources available for
defense.
If it is true in this regard, that scarcity is the midwife of good
strategy, Washington is entering a golden age of strategic
thinking. The domestic pressures on resources are the result
of a historic convergence of four deficits: (1) the budget deficit
and the political requirements to reduce federal spending; (2)
the trade deficit and attendant requirements to make U.S.
industry competitive on the world market; (3) the social deficit
visible in every congressional district in the form of local
demands for resources in education, law enforcement,
housing, public works (roads and bridges), health care, and
environmental protection and restoration; and (4) the threat
deficit which competes with the surge in domestic demands on
resources-we won the cold war and the Soviet threat to
Europe and to the Third World has retreated in geopolitical and
philosophical defeat.
"Threat deficit" accurately describes the changes in our
relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet, as this threat recedes,
the Third World grows more unstable and volatile, threatening
U.S. and NATO interests with diffuse challenges at constantly
shifting points on the map. The threat deficit may, in fact, prove
to be a shift from a centralized threat of global war to a highly
decentralized threat of diverse regional conflicts that in the
aggregate will require a more versatile and flexible NATO
capability.
The end of the cold war does not mean the end of political,
ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological, and military
rivalries. Neither is it likely to produce an end to the global
struggle for power and influence. Until the "new world order" is
established, the old and familiar NATO Alliance is a prudent
safety net against the twin dangers of international threats and
free-falling defense budgets in capitals, including Washington,
23
that may be pressed by domestic politics to reduce their
commitments to collective defense.
ENDNOTES
1. The first broad outlines of the new strategy appeared in the London
Declaration issued by the heads of state participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council on July 5-6, 1990, and in several speeches by
Supreme Allied Commander, General John R. Galvin. See, for example,
Transcript of SACEUR's Remarks with the Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, Washington, DC, January 8,1991.
2. Victor Kremenyuk, "Five Years of Perestroika," paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington,
DC, April 13, 1990. The author is an economist at the Institute for the Study
of the United States and Canada in Moscow.
3. Robert Leavitt, "Next Steps for European Arms Reductions," Arms
Control Today, Vol. 21, Number 1, January/February 1991, p. 13.
4. Thomas Graham, Jr., "The CFE Story: Tales From the Negotiating
Table," Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, Number 1, January/February 1991,
p. 10.
5. The brainstorming sessions took place within the North Atlantic
Council (NAC). These produced guidance to the Strategy Review Group
(SRG) chaired by Michael Legge. The SRG produced the draft
political-military strategy which will become the guidance for the NATO
Military Committee (MC) as it develops specific military strategies. The
process was described by Michael Legge in a speech before a SHAPE
Plans and Policy Conference at SHAPE Headquarters, December 13,
1990.
6. Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Under Europe's Umbrella," National Journal,
Vol. 22, No. 14, April 7, 1990, pp. 826-831.
7. George Wilson, "NATO Commander Envisions 'Fire Brigade' Role,"
The Washington Post, December 5,1990, p. 29.
8. Izvestia commentary quoted in The Wall Street Journal, March 4,
1991, p. A5.
9. These issue, are detailed in Douglas T. Stuart's, Can NATO
Transcend Its European Borders?, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 21,1991.
10. Galvin speech, p. 13.
24
11. The London Declaration, mimeographed copy, July 6, 1990, pp.
5-6.
12. This was the conclusion of a Department of Defense study chaired
by Fred Ike and Albert Wohlstetter, Discriminate Deterrence, Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 1988, pp. 2, 8, 30, 33-35.
13. Discussed by Catherine M Kelleher in "Short-Range Nuclear
Weapons: What Future in Europe?" Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, No. 1,
January/February 1991, pp. 17-21.
14. Philip A. Karber, "Conventional Arms Control, or Why Nunn is
Better Than None," in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thompson, eds.,
Conventional Arms Control and The Security of Europe, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1988, p. 174.
15. This theme was stressed in many of Ogarkov's publications in the
early 1980s. See, for example, "Reliable Defense to Peace," Red Star,
September 23, 1983, p. 2, and "The Defense of Socialism: the Experience
of History and the Present," Red Star, March 9, 1984, p. 3.
16. Airland Battle envisions mobile forces able to use quick maneuvers
and decentralized execution of offensive missions to put enemy forces on
the defensive. Airland Battle incorporates a deep reconnaissance-strike
system as one component in a comprehensive doctrine that also includes
military operations at the front or points of attack and in rear areas where
enemy forces may have penetrated. Airland Battle stresses the need to plan
for an integrated battlefield--deep, front, and rear. This is a sharp contrast
to its doctrinal predecessor that was exclusively preoccupied with the direct
battle at the front.
17. Kelleher, p. 19.
18. Galvin speech, p. 13.
19. Strategic warning includes notifications or indicators that hostilities
may be imminent. Warnings may be short, in the form of mobilization or the
massing of troops, or long in the case of a hostile state building a large war
industry and army. Tactical warnings are those that provide clues as to the
precise time and place of an armed attack.
20. Fred Ikle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan
Administration, suggests warning time could be measured in years-the
amount of time that it would take to re-Stalinize Eastern Europe. Ironically,
NATO flanks may now be more vulnerable than NATO's old "Central front."
However, aggression here would allow more time for counterdeployments
and reinforcements than a sudden, massive assault against the heart of
Europe. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney commented on the
25
relationship between reduced forward deployment and warning time. "[We
will] rely on Reserves that could be called up and have a few months to get
ready." See Defense Issues, Vol. 5, No. 25, Reprint of Press Conference,
Brussels, May 23, 1990, p. 2.
21. For a detailed analysis of the Soviet options in developing a new
military strategy, see David Glantz, "Soviet Military Strategy in the 1990's:
In Search of a More Rational Approach," paper presented at the Second
Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA,
February 8, 1991.
22. In Washington, the Gulf crisis resulted in a major reevaluation of
force structure and mobilization policy that will affect NATO contingencies.
For example, of the more than 200,000 reserves called to active duty, the
vast majority served in combat support roles such as transportation,
logistics, and medical services. Active-duty forces deployed during the early
reinforcement phase could not have operated without them. However, the
three, high profile Army National Guard combat brigades that were
designated for NATO contingencies in which they were to rapidly reinforce
("Round-out") active duty brigades to form whole divisions were never
deployed. Their state of combat readiness precluded deployment as either
early or follow-on reinforcements. According to Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney, "It was unrealistic to expect part-time soldiers to maintain
readiness rates as high as their active-duty counterparts.... Instead of using
guard combat brigades in future wars as integral parts of fast-deploying
divisions, they might better be organized into their own divisions that would
be expected to train 90 to 120 days before being sent into battle." See,
Barton Gellman, "Cheney Says Guard Units May Need Reorganizing," The
Washington Post, March 15, 1991, p. 34. Without increased warning time
in the European theater, Secretary Cheney's radical departure from
long-standing mobilization policies would be inconceivable. However, with
both increased warning time and fewer active forces, reliance on reserves
is credible for both NATO and global contingencies provided that active duty
forces are adequate for immediate contingencies, early reinforcement (with
reserve combat service and support), and backed by reserve divisions that
are designated as follow-on reinforcements, but with 90 to 120 days training
available between mobilization and deployment.
26
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Mbjor General Padl G. Cerjan
C -nrnaf
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel Karl W. Robinson
Author
Dr. Gary L Guertner
Editor
Wr& Niarlanne P. Cowling
Secretary
MsL Patricia A. Bonrmeu
http://dia-kosmos.blogspot.gr/
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