Το μεγαλύτερο γερμανικό Think-Tank Bertelsmann-Stiftung, που ανήκει στο εκδοτικό μεγαθήριο Bertelsmann, έδωσε πρόσφατα στην δημοσιότητα ένα policy paper/Strategiepapier με τον τίτλο "Beyond 2010 - European Grand Strategy in a Global Age".
Το χαρτί θα πρέπει να κινήσει το ενδιαφέρον της κυβέρνησης...
Το policy paper, που συνετάχθη από την λεγόμενη Venusberg-Gruppe του Bertelsmann-Stiftung, έχει σαν θέμα του την περαιτέρω ισχυροποίηση της "Ευρώπης" στον πλανήτη και περιέχει οδηγίες για την σύσταση ενός συμβουλίου ασφαλείας, αποτελούμενου από αντιπροσώπους των επτά κρατών με τον μεγαλύτερο στρατιωτικό προϋπολογισμό, το οποίο θα συντονίζει την κοινή πολιτική ασφαλείας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.
Το χαρτί θα πρέπει να κινήσει το ενδιαφέρον της κυβέρνησης...
Το policy paper, που συνετάχθη από την λεγόμενη Venusberg-Gruppe του Bertelsmann-Stiftung, έχει σαν θέμα του την περαιτέρω ισχυροποίηση της "Ευρώπης" στον πλανήτη και περιέχει οδηγίες για την σύσταση ενός συμβουλίου ασφαλείας, αποτελούμενου από αντιπροσώπους των επτά κρατών με τον μεγαλύτερο στρατιωτικό προϋπολογισμό, το οποίο θα συντονίζει την κοινή πολιτική ασφαλείας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.
Αυτό που ενδιαφέρει την Ελλάδα είναι ότι το χαρτί ζητάει ταυτόχρονα και την απόλυτη αποδυνάμωση των μικρότερων κρατών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως στους τομείς της εξωτερικής και στατιωτικής πολιτικής.
Όπως διαπιστώνουν οι μελετητές που το συνέταξαν, οι βασικές προϋποθέσεις για την αρχηγία των ΗΠΑ την εποχή της συγκρούσεως των συστημάτων "έχει πάψει πλέον να ισχύει , διότι εισήλθαμε σε μια νέα εποχή, εκείνη της πολυπολιτισμικότητας (multiculturalism) και άρα οι ΗΠΑ θα πρέπει να αρχίσουν να σκέπτονται την δυνατότητα συνεταιρισμού (partnership) με άλλες δυνάμεις ενώ οι Ευρωπαίοι θα πρέπει να συνειδητοποιήσουν ότι την αξίζουν .
Κάθε κεφάλαιο της μελέτης τελειώνει με την φράση "τώρα η πότε".
Όπως διαπιστώνουν οι μελετητές που το συνέταξαν, οι βασικές προϋποθέσεις για την αρχηγία των ΗΠΑ την εποχή της συγκρούσεως των συστημάτων "έχει πάψει πλέον να ισχύει , διότι εισήλθαμε σε μια νέα εποχή, εκείνη της πολυπολιτισμικότητας (multiculturalism) και άρα οι ΗΠΑ θα πρέπει να αρχίσουν να σκέπτονται την δυνατότητα συνεταιρισμού (partnership) με άλλες δυνάμεις ενώ οι Ευρωπαίοι θα πρέπει να συνειδητοποιήσουν ότι την αξίζουν .
Κάθε κεφάλαιο της μελέτης τελειώνει με την φράση "τώρα η πότε".
Παρακάτω μερικά αποσπάσματα από το χαρτί.
Bertelsmann-Stiftung
The Venusberg Group
Beyond 2010 - European Grand Strategy in a Global Age
Guetersloh, July 2007
(...)
4.1 Establishing Leadership
The focus of this report is the generation of global security effect by Europeans founded on a new political realism about Europe's world role, the consolidation of Europe's strategic effort and the realisation of relevant European capabilities. The report is unequivocal in calling for clear recognition that it is the member-states that lead security in Europe with the Union acting as the aggregator and agent of the states. There are no pretensions herein to create a European super-state through the back door. However, so long as considerable controversy remains over questions of organisation, analysis and funding member-states, particularly the larger ones that enjoy far more cohesive crisis managements structures, will be unwilling to invest further in the future development of the strategic structures of the Union.
(...)
Whilst recognising the need to avoid mechanistic approaches there are certain leadership/power realities at the core of European security. According to IISS "The Military Balance 2007" the defence budgets for EU in 2006 totalled €164.3bn (at 5 May 2007 exchange rates for UK and other non-Euro states). British spending in 2006 on defence was €41.9bn or 26% of the total. French spending was €35.4bn or 22% of the total, whilst German spending was €27.9bn or 17% of the total. Thus the biggest three EU member-states spent 65% of all defence expenditure by the EU 27. In other words, 24 EU member-states are spending an average of €3bn per state per annum on defence which is insufficient to generate the capabilities already identified. Equally, there is a clear second rank grouping. In 2006 Italy spent €12.1bn or 7% of the total, the Netherland €7.8bn or 5% of the total and Spain spent €7.7bn again 5% of the total. Sweden spent €4.3bn or 3% of the total and Poland €4.3bn or 3% of the total. Thus, the five second rank states represent some 23% of the total defence expenditure of the EU. Eight EU member-states thus represent 88% of total expenditure on defence by EU member-states whilst the remaining 19 member-states can only muster 12% of which a significant portion of that is provided by Greece.
The message from the figures is clear. The smaller member-states need to make a choice between moving ahead through some form of security and defence integration or providing niche support to the bigger European powers and organising themselves to that end. Indeed, whilst the trirectoire is necessary it is not sufficient, given the limitations of Britain, France and Germany, which is why other major countries must be involved in such a process from the outset.
Clearly, there is a natural form of order with the EU given the land focus of both the French and the Germans and the maritime/amphibious emphasis of the British. With all the major states involved, and notwithstanding that they will need to retain the capacity to operate either alone or with other partners, all EU member-states would enjoy some incentives to buy into the future development of a strategic ESDP. Those that do not invest in a strong ESDP will inevitably face marginalisation.
To further such a goal a new strategic security framework should be established through the creation of a Security and Defence Group under the authority of the European Council to ensure leadership takes place within the institutional framework of the EU and not beyond. Such a Group would establish the primacy of the member-states by overseeing all of the Union's security activities. One approach would be to establish a leadership group comprised of Britain, French, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain as permanent members drawn from those states in the first and second layers of power. A further six states from the remaining block of eighteen could then sit for a period of two years, whilst the other twelve member-states would during that period lead challenge clusters. These would be task-oriented working groups charged with looking at specific security issues, such as climate change, water shortage, the changing demand for food, population growth etc.
(...)
6.3 Accelerating European Defence Modernisation
Key is acceleration of European defence modernisation. The various and varying attempts of member-states to restructure and reform their armed forces must be reviewed, aligned and managed as part of a European Modernisation Concept underpinning the post-2010 Defence Strategy. Such a concept would need to consider all aspects of effective military operational engagement. Thereafter, a regular EU Strategic Defence Review could prove very useful. Certainly, Europeans must make better use of the ESS dialogue and process to close the gap between Europe's strategic environment and its security and defence capabilities by generating effective force planning guidance that is in harmonisation with NATO's defence planning process.
The EU must also move rapidly to build on its useful, but limited Long-Term Vision paper through the further elaboration of likely future missions and thus developing a range of planning guidelines based on tasks, capabilities and instruments in a single EU strategic defence concept within the European Defence Strategy. Indeed, any such analysis will further the growing intensity of co-operation between armed forces given the balance between costs and military effect that EU member-states will need to strike.
Over the medium-term the European Defence Agency (EDA) must be given the brief and the resources to task industry to develop a range of strategic enablers, inter alia limited space-based assets (reconnaissance, navigation and communications satellites), global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), together with advanced communications and effective ground surveillance. The EU should also examine the feasibility of affordable theatre missile defence, effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea) and precision-guided munitions. Consequently, the European Capability Action Plan and the Prague Capabilities Commitment need to be harmonised and upgraded to that end. Indeed, as the 16 November 2006 European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy states, "...the capabilities of the Member States' armed forces and their availability to the EU are influenced by the fact that most Member States are members of both the EU and NATO and maintain one set of armed forces at the disposal of both organisations' demands"..."...therefore,...the EU should continue to work intensively with NATO, especially in the area of capabilities development".
Financial burden-sharing must also be improved and the EDA could play a vital role therein. Common funding for all ESDP missions is a first order prerequisite for an effective ESDP. The moment a decision is taken at the supreme political level, a pre-determined financial contribution by each member-state to an EU mission must be put in place. Thereafter, a programme of funding for certain common strategic assets on the basis of a fixed distribution of costs among the member-states would not only help to give Europe strategic options, but also reinforce a value-for-money approach to Europe's emerging strategic role.
(...)
Source:
The Venusberg Group: Beyond 2010 - European Grand Strategy in a Global Age, Guetersloh, July 2007
http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/2007_Venusberg_Beyond_2010.pdf
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst_engl/hs.xsl/prj_7072_7084.htmhttp://berlin-athen.de/index.php?id=126&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=587&tx_faq_faq=&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=220&no_cache=1&print=1&type=98
http://dia-kosmos.blogspot.gr/
Bertelsmann-Stiftung
The Venusberg Group
Beyond 2010 - European Grand Strategy in a Global Age
Guetersloh, July 2007
(...)
4.1 Establishing Leadership
The focus of this report is the generation of global security effect by Europeans founded on a new political realism about Europe's world role, the consolidation of Europe's strategic effort and the realisation of relevant European capabilities. The report is unequivocal in calling for clear recognition that it is the member-states that lead security in Europe with the Union acting as the aggregator and agent of the states. There are no pretensions herein to create a European super-state through the back door. However, so long as considerable controversy remains over questions of organisation, analysis and funding member-states, particularly the larger ones that enjoy far more cohesive crisis managements structures, will be unwilling to invest further in the future development of the strategic structures of the Union.
(...)
Whilst recognising the need to avoid mechanistic approaches there are certain leadership/power realities at the core of European security. According to IISS "The Military Balance 2007" the defence budgets for EU in 2006 totalled €164.3bn (at 5 May 2007 exchange rates for UK and other non-Euro states). British spending in 2006 on defence was €41.9bn or 26% of the total. French spending was €35.4bn or 22% of the total, whilst German spending was €27.9bn or 17% of the total. Thus the biggest three EU member-states spent 65% of all defence expenditure by the EU 27. In other words, 24 EU member-states are spending an average of €3bn per state per annum on defence which is insufficient to generate the capabilities already identified. Equally, there is a clear second rank grouping. In 2006 Italy spent €12.1bn or 7% of the total, the Netherland €7.8bn or 5% of the total and Spain spent €7.7bn again 5% of the total. Sweden spent €4.3bn or 3% of the total and Poland €4.3bn or 3% of the total. Thus, the five second rank states represent some 23% of the total defence expenditure of the EU. Eight EU member-states thus represent 88% of total expenditure on defence by EU member-states whilst the remaining 19 member-states can only muster 12% of which a significant portion of that is provided by Greece.
The message from the figures is clear. The smaller member-states need to make a choice between moving ahead through some form of security and defence integration or providing niche support to the bigger European powers and organising themselves to that end. Indeed, whilst the trirectoire is necessary it is not sufficient, given the limitations of Britain, France and Germany, which is why other major countries must be involved in such a process from the outset.
Clearly, there is a natural form of order with the EU given the land focus of both the French and the Germans and the maritime/amphibious emphasis of the British. With all the major states involved, and notwithstanding that they will need to retain the capacity to operate either alone or with other partners, all EU member-states would enjoy some incentives to buy into the future development of a strategic ESDP. Those that do not invest in a strong ESDP will inevitably face marginalisation.
To further such a goal a new strategic security framework should be established through the creation of a Security and Defence Group under the authority of the European Council to ensure leadership takes place within the institutional framework of the EU and not beyond. Such a Group would establish the primacy of the member-states by overseeing all of the Union's security activities. One approach would be to establish a leadership group comprised of Britain, French, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain as permanent members drawn from those states in the first and second layers of power. A further six states from the remaining block of eighteen could then sit for a period of two years, whilst the other twelve member-states would during that period lead challenge clusters. These would be task-oriented working groups charged with looking at specific security issues, such as climate change, water shortage, the changing demand for food, population growth etc.
(...)
6.3 Accelerating European Defence Modernisation
Key is acceleration of European defence modernisation. The various and varying attempts of member-states to restructure and reform their armed forces must be reviewed, aligned and managed as part of a European Modernisation Concept underpinning the post-2010 Defence Strategy. Such a concept would need to consider all aspects of effective military operational engagement. Thereafter, a regular EU Strategic Defence Review could prove very useful. Certainly, Europeans must make better use of the ESS dialogue and process to close the gap between Europe's strategic environment and its security and defence capabilities by generating effective force planning guidance that is in harmonisation with NATO's defence planning process.
The EU must also move rapidly to build on its useful, but limited Long-Term Vision paper through the further elaboration of likely future missions and thus developing a range of planning guidelines based on tasks, capabilities and instruments in a single EU strategic defence concept within the European Defence Strategy. Indeed, any such analysis will further the growing intensity of co-operation between armed forces given the balance between costs and military effect that EU member-states will need to strike.
Over the medium-term the European Defence Agency (EDA) must be given the brief and the resources to task industry to develop a range of strategic enablers, inter alia limited space-based assets (reconnaissance, navigation and communications satellites), global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), together with advanced communications and effective ground surveillance. The EU should also examine the feasibility of affordable theatre missile defence, effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea) and precision-guided munitions. Consequently, the European Capability Action Plan and the Prague Capabilities Commitment need to be harmonised and upgraded to that end. Indeed, as the 16 November 2006 European Parliament resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy states, "...the capabilities of the Member States' armed forces and their availability to the EU are influenced by the fact that most Member States are members of both the EU and NATO and maintain one set of armed forces at the disposal of both organisations' demands"..."...therefore,...the EU should continue to work intensively with NATO, especially in the area of capabilities development".
Financial burden-sharing must also be improved and the EDA could play a vital role therein. Common funding for all ESDP missions is a first order prerequisite for an effective ESDP. The moment a decision is taken at the supreme political level, a pre-determined financial contribution by each member-state to an EU mission must be put in place. Thereafter, a programme of funding for certain common strategic assets on the basis of a fixed distribution of costs among the member-states would not only help to give Europe strategic options, but also reinforce a value-for-money approach to Europe's emerging strategic role.
(...)
Source:
The Venusberg Group: Beyond 2010 - European Grand Strategy in a Global Age, Guetersloh, July 2007
http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/2007_Venusberg_Beyond_2010.pdf
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst_engl/hs.xsl/prj_7072_7084.htmhttp://berlin-athen.de/index.php?id=126&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=587&tx_faq_faq=&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=220&no_cache=1&print=1&type=98
http://dia-kosmos.blogspot.gr/
Comments